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PREFACE
Compared to the notonous dictatorships of Africa, Tanzania’s 
human rights record comes out with flying colours. But, as the 
former President, Mwalimu Nyererc, once said ‘You do not judge 
your health by comparing it with that of a sick person! ’. And in that 
regard, Tanzania does not have a clean certificate of even average 
good health. As a matter of fact, the reeord is quite blemished - not 
in details, whieh is not really the concern of this monograph and 
I have not quibbled about it - but in larger questions, in questions 
which concern the large masses and the popular classes of the 
people.
The present monograph is not a survey of the state of human 
rights in Tanzania. It is rather a study of, what broadly may be 
described as, the right to life and liberty. What I have done is to 
illustrate the violation of these rights through the use of state 
coercion. In this regard I have further demonstrated the authoritar­
ian nature of the legal system and related it to the neo-colonial- 
character of the political economy - the thesis which I have 
explored in my other recent writings, which have been cited at the 
appropriate place in the text.
Several case studies which have been presented in some detail, 
not only give the actual flavour of the concrete human rights 
situation but, I believe, vividly illustrate the lack of rights-con- 
sciousness at various levels ol the state system. This is another 
piece ol evidence to show that legal ideology has little hegemonic 
signilicance in a dominated lormation and that law is a direct and 
unmediated instrument ol coercion.
xi
Finally, as I have mentioned in the conclusion, and repeat here, 
I do not sec people as ‘passive victims’ of human rights violations; 
rather I see them as capable of resisting and fighting for their 
rights. We consider the lip-service paid to rights-ideology by 
African states and imperialism as part of their ruling armoury to 
legitimise authoritarianism and cold-war rivalries, respectively. 
While for the people that ideology, reeonceptualised and dis­
tanced from imperialist propaganda, is the very stuff of which 
their daily struggles are made. Human rights therefore must play 
an ideologically mobilising function in that struggle against impe­
rialism and for democracy from below.
This monograph deals with Tanzania Mainland only. Hope­
fully, it will encourage some concerned Zanzibari to do a similar 
study of Zanzibar, both in its internal aspect, but even more 
important, in the external aspect of Zanzibar’s relation to the 
Mainland.
Issa G. Shivji
University of Dar es Salaam 
July 1989.
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INTRODUCTION
COERCION AND CONSENSUS IN LAW
All law is ultimately expressed in the use, or the apprehension of 
the use, of force. Yet ideologically, i.e. in consciousness, law is 
related to justice and rights rather than force. This apparent contra­
diction has been a subject of continuous jurisprudential discourse. 
The contradiction is apparent precisely because both positions, 
i.e. Taw as force’ and Taw as justice’, are correct on different 
levels.
Among the great victories of the bourgeois revolutions in the 
west was the enthronement of, what Engels so precisely called, the 
‘juridical world outlook’1 of the bourgeoisie. The central element 
in this outlook is the notion of ‘equality’. The status-based inher­
ent inequality of the feudal era was overthrown and replaced by 
the contract-based legal ‘equality’. This development was well 
captured in Sir Henry Maine’s oft-quoted dictum that the move­
ment of hitherto progressive societies has been from status to 
contract.2 Marx summed up the difference between the feudal and 
the capitalist modes as ‘the medieval mode of production, the po­
litical expression of which is privilege, and the modern mode of 
production, of which right as such, equal right, is the expression,
> 3
The idea of equality of all human beings as such is, as Engels 
noted, primeval but thousands of years had to pass before that idea 
was translated into a ‘claim to equal political and social status’ or 
a demand that ‘men should have equal rights in the state and 
society’.4 It is in the latter form that the concept of equality (rights 
or justice)5 is embedded in law. The concept of equality is thus a 
defining and specific chractcristic of the bourgeois law-form.
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Various righls-thcscs, from the philosophers of the Enlighten­
ment to modern jurists like Rawls6 and Dworkin7, take the eoncept 
of equality as their point of departure.
Marx, in his seatlcred observations on law, showed how the 
law-form reflects the equivalence of commodity-exchange on the 
market.8 Pashukanis later generalised these ideas and developed 
his famous commodity-exchange thesis of law.6 The notions of 
equality, justice and rights therefore reside on the level of law- 
form (level of phenomenon) and help to ‘mask’ or ‘disguise’ its 
content which rests on the ultimate use or apprehension of the use 
of force. Thus ‘law as coercion’ and ‘law as consensus’ are not 
mutually exclusive explanations of law but rather explanations of 
law which correspond to different levels; which levels can be 
explained in terms of historical materalism, as was done by Marx 
and Pashukanis.
The separation between the legal form and its content (between 
phenomenon and essence), as a part of a series of separations 
(between abstract and concercte labour; between state and soci­
ety), enabled the formation of the global juridical world outlook 
of the bourgeoisie as well as let legal ideology attain hegemony in 
developed capitalist formations. 10 Coercion therefore does not 
appear on the surface of law but is clothed in the consensual 
notions of equality, justice, rights etc. The state itself, which is the 
repository of all legitimate violence and force, appears as a 
guarantor, a protector and a custodian of rights. ‘Might’, if you 
like, puts on the garb o f ‘right’ and thence the ideology that ‘might 
is not right’ attains societal consensus or hegemony in the 
Gramscian sense.
Matters stand differently with regard to law and legal ideology 
in Alrica. Here the state and the legal system have been character­
ised as authoritarian.11 Force appears on the surface of law and
2
legal ideology is peripheralised. It is the eeonomistic ideology of 
devclopmentalism which occupies the central terrain.12 Notions 
of equality, justice, rights etc. exist, if at all, in embryonic or 
emerging civil society rather than being embedded in the law- 
form. As it has been argued, the civil society itself is hardly 
constituted. Bayart expresses it thus:
In sum, the concept of civil society seems best able to 
explain - by its absence - the continuing existence of 
African autocracy. In situations of tight political 
control, which prevent any organised opposition or 
explicitly political resistance and which force the 
leaders of the oppressed to ‘move at chameleon’s 
(agonisingly slow) pace towards an objective’, ... 
generalising ‘strategic movements’ are less effective 
than secretive ‘tactics’ in attacking state control.13 
The ruling class in Africa may rule through the 
instrument of law but The Law rarely rules.14
Elsewhere I have argued that the relations of exploitation of 
labour in the dominated formations of Africa are based on unequal 
exchange and super-exploitation15 In colonial and neo-colonial 
formations, labour itself is not ‘free’ i.e. free to create exchange 
values and to be exchanged at value. Both the peasant’s labour and 
the worker’s labour power are ‘paid’ below their value in which 
the producer cedes part of his necessary consumption to the appro- 
priator. This unequal exchange can only be reproduced through 
the use of force. And it is the state which is centrally involved in 
the use of this force to reproduce the neo-colonial relations of 
production. Substituting ‘force’ for ‘law’ in Thompson’s dic­
tum16, we may say that in Africa state force is deeply intricated 
within the very basis of productive relations which are inoperable 
without this force.
3
Marx’s succinct contrast between what he called the ‘l'ree 
labour’ of the modern world and the ‘forced labour’ of the ancient 
world as the basis of the opposed notions of ‘equality’ and 
‘freedom’ in each case, fits like a glove the neo-colonial situation 
in Africa. Marx writes,
Thus, if the economic form, exchange in every 
respect posits the equality of the subjects, the content, 
the material, both individual and objective, which 
impels them to exchange, posits freedom. Hence 
equality and freedom are not only respected in ex­
change which is based on exchange values, but the 
exchange of exchange values is the real productive 
basis of all equality and freedom. As pure ideas, 
equality and freedom are merely idealised expres­
sions of this exchange; developed in juridical, politi­
cal and social relations, they are merely this basis at a 
higher level. And indeed this has been confirmed by 
history. Equality and freedom at the higher level are 
the exact opposite of freedom and equality in the 
ancient world, which were not based on developed 
exchange value, but which on the contrary perished 
through its development. They presuppose relations 
ofproductionnotyet realised in the ancient world, nor 
indeed in the Middle Ages. Direct forced labour was 
the foundation of the ancient world; it was on this 
existing basis that the community rested. Labour 
itself regarded as a privilege, as still particularised, 
not labour generally producing exchange value, was 
the foundation of the Middle Ages.17
The fundamental difference between Marx’s ancient world 
and the neo-colonial world of Africa, of course, lies in the fact that 
the latter is not some early stage of a developing society, but a
4
society dominated by imperialism and therefore responding to the 
laws of accumulation of monopoly capitalism.18
In such situations it is therefore, more correct to speak of 
rights-struggle rather than rights-thesis. Notions of equality, jus­
tice, rights etc., still have, in Engels words, an ‘agitational’ (as 
opposed to explanatory) role.19 They have to be constituted in 
popular consciousness as much as embedded in the legal form.
The study of violation of rights in Tanzania in this monograph 
is an apt illustration of the several theoretical observations made 
in this introduction. Firstly, we submit that the primary and sig­
nificant violator of rights in Africa generally is the state itself. 
Therefore, rights as ‘claims’ arc essentially against the stale, and 
rights-struggle itself is in the nature of a democratic struggle with 
broader implications on the organisation of the state and civil 
society. Secondly, violations of rights are not some episodes in the 
lives of individual citizens but rather the life-situation of the 
masses of citizens i.e. groups and collectivities. Thirdly, follow­
ing from our foregoing arguments about the central role of state 
force without deep ideological mediations, law and legality play 
little role, if any, cither in restraining the use of force or in 
legitimating it in the eyes of the people. We shall continually 
witness this lack of legal and rights-consciousness in several case 
studies in this monograph.
Finally, rights-struggle in Africa, of necessity, has to be from 
below constituting the process of the formation of civil society. 
We will return to the last question in our conclusion.
5
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CHAPTER ONE
ORGANS OF COERCION AND RIGHT TO LIFE AND
LIBERTY
A. RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY
Right to lil'e and liberty are basic, or core, rights around which 
other rights revolve. For the purposes of this monograph, I restrict 
myself to the fundamental aspects of these rights. Right to life 
therefore refers essentially to the right to exist and freedom from 
deprivation of life. Secondly, it refers to the right of being treated 
with human dignity and freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrad­
ing ‘punishment’ or treatment.1
In some jurisdictions, the right to life has been judicially 
extended to include the right to ‘livelihood 2. The latter presuma­
bly interfaces with some of the rights which are traditionally 
categorised under the rubric of social and economic rights. These 
place positive obligations on the slate to provide a wholesome life 
to its citizens. For the purposes of this monograph, however, we 
will be concerned with only the negative aspect of this right to the 
extent that it puls restraint on the use of coercion by the state.
The right to life (in its aspect of existence and protection of the 
physical body) is stipulated in the Bill of Rights, which was added 
to the Tanzanian Constitution for the first time in 1984.3 Article 14
provides,
Every individual has a right to exist and receive 
protection from society for one’s life, in accordance 
with the law.
The claw-back4 nature of this provision is intriguing, to say the 
least. In international human rights instruments, including the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights5, which otherwise 
is fraught with claw-back clauses, it is unusual to make such a 
basic right ‘subject to law’. Whether the judiciary will pay much 
heed to this limitation, remains to be seen.
The other aspect of the right to life, i.e. freedom from torture, 
cruel and degrading punishment and treatment is dealt with in 
specific terms in Article 13(6)(e) under which cruel, inhuman and 
undignified punishment is prohibited.6
The right to liberty and security of person is provided in Article 
15 and a person may not be deprived of such right except in 
‘circumstances and in accordance with the procedures established 
by law’. Such law and procedures, it is submitted, must be based 
on the set of principles stipulated in Article 13(6). These are:
—  right to be heard before a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal and 
the right to appeal;7
—  presumption of innocence until proved guilty;
—  not to be held guilty under retrospective criminal legislation 
or be subjected to a penalty heavier than what was provided at the 
time of the commission of the offence;
— right to be treated and respected as a human being at all times 
during investigation, interrogation and conduct of criminal pro­
ceedings as well as while under any detention and during the 
implementation of any punishment; and
—  freedom from torture, cruel, degrading, undignified and in 
human treatment and punishment.
Besides the limitations stipulated in the relevant articles them­
selves, the right to life and liberty arc apparently also subject to the 
cumulative limitations of the general derogation clauses in Article
10
Article 30 has been a subject of severe criticism by academics 
for its very ambiguous formulation.8 Read literally, it could easily 
be used to justify virtually any breach of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms. Indeed some persons in authority seem to hold the 
view that a majority of the ‘offending’ legislation on the statute 
book could be validated under this clause9 For example, the 
Attorney General and the Minister of Justice recently defended 
the re-introduction of mandatory corporal punishment under this 
article, it being argued that the imposition of such punishment was 
in the interest of the community at large!10
However, it is possible for the judiciary to give Article 30 a 
restrictive interpretation by subjecting it to the standards expected 
in a democratic society stipulated, inter alia, in international 
human rights instruments. In the only judicial decision11 on the 
BillofRighlssofar, the High Court of Tanzania under Mwalusanya, 
J. construed Article 30 restrictively for to do otherwise, he argued, 
would render the Bill of Rights an ‘empty shell’ (p.5). Mwalusanya, 
J. took the position that the phrase ‘the law’ in claw-back clauses 
like ‘in accordance with the law’ or ‘subject to the law’ or the pro­
vision that the rights of the community provided by ‘the law’ may 
override individual rights etc., meant something more than simply 
‘an Act duly passed by the legislature’. ‘If the Act relied on should 
itself be declared inoperative as violating a fundamental constitu­
tional right it is not “ law”.’ (p.8). Mwalusanya, J. elaborated his 
argument thus:
...I believe that the Rule of Law means more than 
acting in accordance with the law. The Rule of Law 
must also mean fairness of the government. Rule of 
Law should extend to the examination of the contents 
of the laws to see whether the letter conforms to the
30 and 31, the later dealing with public emergency.
11
ideal; and that the law does not give the government 
too much power. The Rule of Law is opposed to the 
rule of arbitrary power. The Rule of Law requires that 
the government should subject to the law rather than 
the law subject to the government. If the law is wide 
enough to justify a dictatorship then there is no Rule 
of Law. Therefore if by the Rule of Law all it means 
is that the government will operate in accordance with 
the “ law”, then the doctrine of Rule of Law becomes 
a betrayal of the individual if the laws themselves are 
not fair but are oppressive and degrading. The Courts 
have to bridge the yawning gap between the letter of 
the law and the reality in the field of Rule of Law .12
These arguments signify, with respect, a very commendable 
approach and, in the ease of Tanzania, probably a clear departure 
from the hitherto dominating positivist trend. Whether this ap­
proach will be upheld by the highest court of law in the land, the 
Court of Appeal, remains to be seen. One hopes that in an 
appropriate matter the Court of Appeal will adopt this approach 
because so much on the Tanzanian statute book (part of which we 
will have occasion to meet in this monograph) hardly meets even 
the minimum standards of the Rule of Law. Regrettably, this was 
also true of the Constitution before it was amended in 1984. As a 
matter of fact, the first President of the Republic, Julius Nyerere, 
is reported to have once remarked, ‘I have sufficient powers under 
the Constitution to be a dictator’ ! 13 Now it speaks well of the 
person of Mwalimu Nyerere that he did not become a dictator in 
spite of the constitutional powers he had to become one, but it 
speaks very poorly of ‘the law’ and the constitutional structures of 
the country under which he ruled Tanzania for quarter of a 
century.
We now turn to the question of the use of state coercion.
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B. STATE COERCION
The modern state is the most centralised expression of the use of 
force. It monopolises the instruments of violence. In developed 
countries, as we saw in the introduction, use of state coercion or 
force is mediated through various legitimating ideologies which 
hold hegemonic position in that they receive, to different degrees, 
the consensus of the ruled classes as well. These ideologies do not 
simply play the role of rationalising the use of force by the state 
and its organs but also, more significantly, act as constraints and 
brakes on the abuse of powers to use force by the state, its organs 
and officials.
When the use of state coercion is not, or thinly, clothed with 
hegemonic ideologies14, it expresses itself in the violation of 
‘human rights’, very often, to use the hackneyed claw-back 
clause, ‘in accordance with the law’.
We distinguish two types of the use of force: ‘legal’ and 
‘illegal’. Legal use of force is where it has been authorised by law 
while the illegal one has not been so authorised. However, this 
does not mean that even legal force is necessarily legitimate. This 
is where conceptions of ‘human rights’ become relevant. Thus it 
is submitted that where force is legal but applied contrary to the 
basic conceptions of human rights or in violation of what may be 
considered absolute minimum standards in a democratic society, 
such use of force amounts to being ‘illegitimate’. This too will 
form part of our investigation.
Besides, in the Tanzanian situation, it may be worthwhile also 
to talk of what might be called ‘extra-legal coercion’. This is the 
application of coercion which strictly, speaking, is illegal, but is 
sanctioned by the highest organs or officials of the state or the 
Party and carried out by immediate perpetrators as if it was in
13
obedience of ‘lawful’ orders. There has been a very wide use of 
this type of coercion.
On another level of analysis, one may also distinguish between 
the use of force on an individual level by a particular official of the 
state and the use of force en masse by certain armed organs of the 
state. Both have been present in Tanzania. The former will be 
largely covered in our chapter on ‘illegal coercion’ while the latter 
will fall under the use of ‘extra-legal coercion’ in, what has come 
to be known in Tanzania, as ‘operations’ and campaigns. Before 
we proceed, it is important, even if briefly, to identify the major 
organs of the state which have been notoriously involved in the 
use of illegal, illegitimate and extra-legal coercion. We look at 
four para-military forces: the People’s Militia, the ‘traditional 
armies’, the National Service and the Field Force Unit.
C. ORGANS OF COERCION
1. People’s Militia
The militia was established in the wake of Portuguese invasion of 
Guinea and Obote’s overthrow by Amin in Uganda which carried 
ominous signals for the Tanzanian regime.15 The establishment of 
the militia by the ruling party, the then Tanganyika African Na­
tional Union (TANU), was in implementation of directions in the 
Party Mwongozo or Guidelines of 1971.
The militia is recruited by Party organs but trained by instruc­
tors from the Tanzania People’s Defence Forces (TPDF). It is 
based in every district at work places and villages. The Militia 
undergo four months training which is designed to produce an 
equivalent of a private soldier16. The people’s militia is directly 
under the Party and, after training, it forms part of the reserve
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army. ‘The District Party Secretary is the militia commander and 
at the Branch level the relevant secretary of the Party becomes the 
commander17. During peace time, the militia do routine police 
duties including participation in various ‘operations’ mounted by 
the state and the Party. During war, it performs rear tasks while 
the young among them may actually fight in the frontline, as they 
indeed did during the war with Idi Amin.
The actual number of the militia is probably difficult to know, 
although one source estimated it around 35000 in 1981-218. In my 
research I could not find any law establishing the People’s Militia. 
One piece of legislation, the People’s Militia (Powers of Arrest) 
Act, 1975 (no.25) confers on the members of the militia powers of 
arrest and search equal to those of a police officer. But this Act 
assumes the existence of, but does not establish, the militia as 
such. The definition of ‘people’s militia’ in this Act is interesting.
“Peoples militia” means an organised group of the 
people of the United Republic operating with the 
authority of and under the aegis of the Government 
and which is receiving any military training or 
participating in any military, quasi-military or law 
enforcement exercise for the protection of the sover­
eignty of the United Republic or for the protection of 
the people or the property of the United Republic, but 
does not include the Police Force, any arm or branch 
of the Defence Forces, the Prisons Service or the 
National Service.19
Strictly the force defined as above does not exist because what 
exists - i.e. the ‘people’s militia’ - is not under the aegis of the gov­
ernment, or established under its authority, but is under the Party. 
To that extent the existence of ‘people’s militia’ is contrary to
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Article 147 of the Constitution, which prohibts any person, organ­
isation or group of people, except the Government, to form or 
maintain an army in the United Republic. Strictly, therefore, the 
use of force by the militia is, at best, extra-legal. Yet this has never 
been an issue, or commented upon even by legal circles, which in 
itself is a comment on the legal consciousness (or rather the lack 
of it) of law-makers, law-implementors and law-receivers in Tan­
zania.
2. ‘Traditional Armies’
If the ‘people’s militia’ was established by the Party from above 
following events in Guinea and Uganda (which were perceived as 
threats to the security of the regime), ‘traditional armies ’ began to 
operate as a result of initiatives from below in regions where cattle 
rustling had become endemic and there was a popular perception 
of the break down of ‘law and order’. Very soon, however, these 
armies were co-opted by the state and converted into some kind of 
semi-regular force to conduct routine police duties.20 This was not 
done under any enactment but rather under the Party. Thus in Mara 
Region, where this army has been operating extensively, the Party 
Regional Executive Committee issued a ‘Code for the Operation 
of the Traditional Army in the Mara Region’ which was consid­
ered by all concerned as the ‘legal authority’ for the existence of 
the army21 The Code purports to give the ‘traditional army’ wide- 
ranging police and judicial powers. It deserves quotation in 
extenso:
Section 1:
1. Deal with the cattle thieves, thieves of fish traps, nets, canoes 
and any other movable property.
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2. Deal with smugglers and those who deal in government 
trophies.
3. Deal with those who manufacture and those found in posse­
ssion of illicit liquor known as moshi, as well as those who 
make bhang.
4. Deal with those pupils who fail to attend school.
5. Deal with rogues and vagabonds as well as those who do not 
take part in the campaign of everyone should work.
6 . To ensure that the youth take part in the national development 
projects.
7 . To encourage closer contact and good relationship among the 
villagers by promoting cultural activities, sports, soccer, 
dance, wrestling and other traditional dances.
8 . To stop illegal businesses of selling goods at illegal prices in
towns and villages.
9. To scrutinize foreigners within the country and send them to 
the appropriate authorities for action in accordance with the 
law.
10. To punish offenders of the above-named offences and similar 
offences in accordance with the traditional ways of their 
respective areas.
11. For any other criminal offences, the offenders should besent 
to the Police to be dealt with in accordance with the law .22
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As was observed by Mwalusanya, J. in the leading case of 
Sangija, where he declared traditional armies unconstitutional, 
the operation of these armies was totally outside the framework of 
law. Following a series of judgments23 by Mwalusanya, J. declar­
ing the so-called ‘traditional armies’ illegal, the People’s Militia 
Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill, 198924 was passed. It 
expanded the definition of ‘people’s militia’ quoted above to 
include the ‘ traditional army ’. It also gives powers to the Minister 
to make regulations for the smooth operation of the militia as 
defined. However, the laws amended deal with compensation for 
in juries by members of the militia sustained in the course of duty25 
and the powers of arrest of the militia26 - which are similar to those 
of the police. The question still remains whether these laws 
establish the people’s militia as such, and whether the existing 
militia and the traditional armies are covered within thedefinition, 
since, in the existing practice they operate under the Party and not 
the Government. (Should the Minister in his regulations promul­
gate that the Party be responsible for the militia, there would still 
remain the question if the power to establish armed forces given 
the government under the Constitution can be delegated to the 
Party).27
3. The National Service
This was established in 1964 under the leadership and guidance of 
Israel. In 1966 it was made compulsory and serves as a system of 
conscription. Since 1975 the Service has been fully amalgamated 
with the Tanzania People’s Defence Forces.28 Frequently, na­
tional servicemen are used in patrol and other duties, although not 
as often as the militia.
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4. The Field Force Unit
If the Militia and the National Service are the creation of the post­
colonial state, the Field Force Unit was bequeathed to the people 
of Tanzania by the colonial state, and it bears all the notoriety of 
its birth. The nucleus of the Force in 1916 came from, ironically, 
South African Defence Forces, which sent the first 31 troopers 
under Major S.T. Davies.29 They were stationed at Wilhemstal 
(Lushoto), where the Germans had carried out massive land 
alienations, to have steadying effect on dispossessed peasants.
Since the Second World War, with the rise of the trade union 
movement, the Force, now called the Motorised Unit, operated as 
a kind of rapid mobile force which could be present within hours 
at any place of ‘riot’. It was used against striking workers as during 
the 1950 dockworkers strike; against protesting peasants as 
against Sukuma peasants and also against recalcitrant national­
ists. At independence, its name was changed to ‘Field Force Unit’ 
or FFU. ‘The notoriety of its ruthlessness has earned it the Swa­
hili translation of its acronym as “ Fanya Fujo Uone” literally 
meaning “If you cause trouble you will face the music.’” 30 In post­
colonial Tanzania, students, workers and peasants have all had the 
taste of that ‘music’. The FFU beat up students during their 1978 
demonstration31; it was used widely during the forced villagisa- 
lion of 1972-7432 as it was also deployed against striking workers 
during the post-Mwongozo workers movement.33 Its ruthlessness 
was once again witnessed in the recent incidence in Kilombero 
where it killed four sugar-cane workers.34
* * *
In the next three chapters we examine the use of state coercion 
in violation of right to life and liberty with illustrative case stud­
ies.
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CHAPTER TWO
LEGAL BUT ILLEGITIMATE COERCION - 1
In this and the next chapter, we discuss a number of statutes (and 
case studies) which authorise use of force in circumstances which 
would be considered in violation of the minimum standards set by 
human rights instruments. So, although force here is legal, in that 
it is statutorily authorised, it is illegitimate. However, this state­
ment needs to be qualified in the light of the 1984 Bill of Rights 
embodied in the Constitution. It is possible to argue, as we do in 
this chapter, that a number of the statutes under consideration 
could be declared inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore 
to that extent void. Strictly then, such statutes, and the use of 
coercion under them, should be regarded as ‘illegal’ and not 
simply ‘illegitimate’. But until such time as there are judicial pro­
nouncements on the statutes under consideration, and to take 
account of the hitherto historical use made of these laws, we will 
continue to use in this monograph the proposed notion of ‘legal 
but illegitimate coercion’.
A. CAPITAL AND CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
The Tanzanian Penal Code, Cap. 16, provides mandatory death 
penalty for the offence of murder and maximum death penalty for 
treason (ss.197 & 39 respectively). Although numerous death 
sentences are passed by Tanzanian courts every year, it is believed 
that few are carried out.1 There is no public movement against 
death penalty and courts do not seem to have expressed much 
opinion on it, although some judges, it seems, would prefer courts 
being granted discretion in the imposition of death penalty.2
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Corporal punishment is one of the punishments permissible 
under the Penal Code (s.28) and, where imposed, it is to be 
inflicted in accordance with the Corporal Punishment Ordinance, 
Cap. 17, and the Corporal Punishment Order3 made thereunder. 
The Ordinance is a carry over from colonial times and has been 
actively applied in post-colonial Tanzania.
The independent government made corporal punishment 
mandatory for certain offences under the Minimum Sentences 
Act, 1963 (no.29). The Bill was greeted with enthusiasm by 
Parliamentarians, some of whom went even further than the gov­
ernment proposals suggesting more torture as part of punishing 
offenders.4 The average number of the incidences of corporal 
punishment between 1963 and 1964 was 2510 per annum, com­
pared to the average of 46 in the previous four years (1958-61) of 
the colonial administration 5 In 1972, mandatory corporal punish­
ment was abolished6, only to be brought back in 1989.7
Once again the honourable members of parliament shocked 
the nation by applauding the re-introduction of corporal punish­
ment. One member even suggested that such punishment should 
be administered in public (market places) and that women offend­
ers should not be exempted .8 Defending the Bill against an objec­
tion of a lone parliamentarian on the ground that corporal punish­
ment might be contrary to the Bill of Rights, the Minister of Justice 
and the Attorney General argued that bandits and robbers were 
breaching the rights of other citizens and therefore it was in the 
interest of the community at large that corporal punishment was 
being re-introduced. The Minister proffered his legal opinion that 
the constitutional validity of the proposed law would be covered 
under the derogation clause, Article 30 of the Constitution.9
On the face of it, corporal punishment is contrary to Article 
13(6)(e) of the Constitution which specifically prohibits cruel,
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inhuman and degrading punishment. The leading case in this 
regard is the decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
which has been followed in Zimbabwe. In Tyrer v United 
Kingdom10, where a 15 year old boy was sentenced by a juvenile 
court in the Isle of Man to three strokes of the birch on conviction 
of assault. The Court found that, while the punishment in the 
instant ease did not constitute torture or inhuman punishment, it 
did amount to ‘degrading’ punishment and therefore was in vio­
lation of Article 311 of the European Convention. The substantive 
paragraph in the judgment deserves to be quoted in extenso:
The very nature of judicial corporal punishment is 
that it involves one human being inflicting physical 
violence on another human being. Furthermore, it is 
institutionalised violence, that is in the present case 
violence permitted by the law, ordered by the judicial 
authorities of the State and carried out by the police 
authorities of the State. Thus, although the applicant 
did not suffer any severe or long-lasting physical 
effects, his punishment - whereby he was 
treated as an object in the power of the authorities - 
constituted an assault on precisely that which it is one 
of the main purposes of Article 3 to protect, namely 
a person’s dignity and physical integrity. Neither can 
it be excluded that the punishment may have had 
adverse psychological effects. The institutionalised 
character of this violence is further compounded by 
the whole aura of official procedure attending the 
punishment and by the fact that those inflicting it 
were total strangers to the offender.12
The ‘aura of official procedure’ attaining corporal punishment 
that the European Court refers to with apparent disgust is even 
more disgusting in Tanzania under the Corporal Punishment
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Order which provides that:
2. A sentence of corporal punishment shall be in­
flicted upon adults upon the bare buttocks with a 
light rattan cane which is free from knots. Such cane 
shall be not less than half an inch and not more than 
five-eighths of an inch in diameter and shall not ex­
ceed forty-two inches in length.
4. During the infliction of a sentence of corporal 
punishment the person undergoing punishment shall 
be so secured that he cannot, by reason of the move­
ment of his body, cause the strokes to fall upon any 
other part of his body than that upon which they are to 
be inflicted in accordance with this Order.
It remains to be seen whether the Tanzanian judiciary will 
countenance such punishment by validating it under Article 30 as 
suggested, rather unfortunately, by the Attorney General. Rather 
than heed the Honourable Attorney General’s gratuitous advice, 
Tanzanian courts may do well to emulate the Zimbabwe Supreme 
Court which has held ‘whipping’ to be an inhuman and degrading 
punishment. Reviewing the position in Zimabawe, South Africa, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the United States, 
Gubbay, J A in Ncube, Tshuma & Ndhlovu v The State13 
concluded that:
Fortunately on the few occasions where the issue of 
whether whipping is constitutionally defensible has 
been judicially considered, it appears to have resulted 
in little difference of opinion, whether imposed upon 
an adult person or a juvenile offender the punishment 
in the main has been branded as both cruel and 
degrading... .
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B. COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT
Collective Punishment Ordinance, Cap. 74, is another piece of 
legislation introduced by the colonial state which continues to be 
used by the independent government. The rationale of this statute 
lies in the colonial anthropology which considered ‘ native’ villag­
ers to be too ‘primitive’ to understand and therefore be subjected 
to individual responsibility and punishment. Therefore whole 
villages or ‘tribes’ and ‘sub-tribes’ could be held responsible and 
punished for a crime committed within the boundaries of their 
vilagc. It was clearly a mechanism on the part of the colonial state 
to strike terror in the hearts of peasants so as to better control them. 
The notion of ‘collective’ punishment, needless to say, is contrary 
to all modern systems of criminology and certainly in breach of 
basic human rights. As Article 7(2) of the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights stipulates, ‘Punishment is personal 
and can be imposed only on the offender’.
Section 2 of the Collective Punishment Ordinance provides that:
The President may impose fines on all or any 
inhabitants of any village, area or district, or members 
of any tribe, sub-tribe, or community if, after inquiry, 
he is satisfied:
(a) That they or any of them have colluded with or 
harboured or failed to take all reasonable means to 
prevent the escape of any criminal;
(b) that they or any of them have suppressed or com­
bined to suppress evidence in any criminal case;
(c) that stolen property having been traced to within 
the limits of any village, area or district, they have 
failed or neglected to restore the property or to trace 
it beyond the limits of such village, area or district;
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The President may fine in like manner the inhabitants of any 
village, area or district where a person is dangerously or latally 
wounded by unlawful attack, or a body of a person believed to be 
unlawfully killed is found therein (s.3). An inquiry under the 
Ordinance is conducted by a magistrate or other judicial officer, 
and the order of the President is final, no appeal lies therefrom.
The power under this Ordinance was used by the President as 
recently as 198414 against Wataturu families resident in eight 
named villages for being allegedly responsible for the deaths of 49 
persons and the theft of 767 heads of cattle, 30 goats, 20 sheep and 
4 donkeys. The President ordered every Kitaturu family resident 
in the said villages to pay ‘such number of cattle, goats, sheep, 
donkeys or its equivalent in other terms as will realize 767 heads 
of cattle; 30 goats; 20 sheep and 4 donkeys.’
Clearly, the provisions of this Ordinance are not only outdated 
but offend a number of rights and freedoms stipulated in the Bill 
of Rights. To date the constitutionality of the Ordinance has not 
been challenged.
C. WITCHCRAFT
The Witchcraft Ordinance, Cap. 18, is also a colonial statute but 
has been often used in post-independence Tanzania.15 Under it a 
District Commissioner has powers to restrict a suspected witch, or 
a person practising witchcraft, to reside in a particular locality in 
his district ‘and further or in the alternative may order such person 
to report to the District Commissioner or to a District Council at 
such intervals not being less than seven days as he shall direct until 
such order shall be varied or revoked . ’16 In the early seventies 
some 30 Wanyambunda in Mbeya were detained under the Ordi­
nance allegedly because they were influencing people against
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The powers granted under this Ordinance can now be chal­
lenged as infringing the freedom of movement as well as the ‘due 
process’ provisions of the Bill of Rights. It may be noted that the 
same Ordinance does create certain offences in respect of practice 
of witchcraft for which charges can be laid and trial held. Under 
the circumstances, it is gratuitous to grant further powers to a 
member of the executive to restrict a person without the usual 
judicial safeguards.
D. FORCE AGAINST THE UNEMPLOYED AND VA­
GRANCY LAWS
The neo-colonial economy creates the problem of the unem­
ployed and other marginalised groups, which swarm the cities in 
large numbers.18 But the same economy is incapable of taking care 
of the problem and so the neo-colonial state steps in with coercion. 
Use of extra-economic coercion to ‘solve’ economic problems is 
the common denominator of the colonial and the neo-colonial 
social orders. The post-independence Tanzanian state has re­
tained, virtually intact, all the colonial vagrancy laws supposedly 
to control this ‘problem’ and has added some of its own.
Under the Townships (Removal of Undesirable Persons) 
Ordinance, Cap. 104, a person who has no regular employment or 
reputable means of livelihood can be detained and served with a 
removal order to leave the town and go to a place specified in the 
order. Under the Destitute Persons Ordinance, Cap.41, a magis­
trate may order a destitute person (who is defined as ‘any person 
without employment and unable to show that he has visible and 
sufficient means of subsistence’19) to return to his usual place of 
residence ‘if he is a native who is not dwelling in his usual place
ujamaa villages 17
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of residence’. Coupled with these are the provisions of the Penal 
Code under which ‘idle and disorderly persons’ and ‘rogues and 
vagabonds’, as the statute terms them, can be convicted of being 
so and imprisoned.20 The so-called ‘idle and disorderly’ include, 
following an amendment of the law in 198321, unemployed and 
even an employed person ‘who is without any lawful excuse, 
found engaged on a frolic of his own at a time he is supposed to 
be engaged in activities connected or relating to the business of his 
employment’.
It is under this armoury of legislation that various ‘round-ups’ 
and campaigns against ‘loiterers’ in Dar es Salaam, and other 
towns, are periodically mounted. And as periodically, leaders at 
the highest echelons of the state and Party condemn the so-called 
‘loiterers’. The then President, Mwalimu Nyerere, called them 
‘criminals and idle parasites’ and instructed his Prime Minister 
not to ‘feel shy to disturb these loiterers’. ‘If we don’t disturb 
loiterers, they will disturb us ...’, he said .22 These ‘loiterers’ 
constituted some 40 per cent of the population over 6 years old in 
Dar es Salaam region in 1984 23 That seems to be much more a 
comment on the nature of the post-independence economy and 
society rather than any evidence of the criminality, idleness or 
parasitism of ‘these loiterers’!
In these ‘crackdowns’, as the official media often terms them, 
people are thoroughly harassed, detained, taken to court, impris­
oned or transported to their ‘homes’. The following story culled 
from the Daily News24 is not only typical but illustrates multi-fold 
biases involved in these incidences of rights-violations.
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Case Study 1: ‘Round-ups’
TWENTY three women, including teenagers who 
were picked up in an overnight swoop in Dar es 
Salaam last Tuesday, have no proper means of earn­
ing a living, a police officer claimed before the Kisutu 
Resident Magistrate’s court on Saturday. Corporal 
James of the Central Police Station in the city told 
presiding Principal Resident Magistrate Joseph 
Masanche that the crackdown followed information 
that there were some women prostitutes wandering in 
the streets of Dar es Salaam.
The accused who pleaded “Not Guilty”, were on 
October 22, this year - at about 9.30 p.m. - found 
along Upanga Road, Garden Avenue, Ohio Street and 
Sokoine Drive “wandering”, according to another 
police officer, Superintendent of Police (SP) Elias 
Mahenge.
SP Mahenge told the court that the accused were 
found along “road pavements and other public places 
wandering from one place to another, and at times 
picked up by cars”.
“They were under such circumstances that could 
lead to the conclusion that their movements were for 
illegal or disorderly purposes”, he charged.
Led by SP Mahcnge, Corporal James - who ap­
peared as the first prosecution witness - said the 
Policemen backed up with two police vans combed 
the streets and arrested the 23 women.
“When we (police) questioned them on how they 
earned their living, some remained silent while others 
said they were waiting for their brothers or friends. 
Others said they were just there”, the corporal said.
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At this point, Principal Resident Magistrate Masan- 
che intervened for a point of clarification.
Masanche:- Many of them (accused) say they 
were rounded up while coming from evening movies 
and that they had their cinema tickets. Could you 
elaborate on that?
Corporal James:- We arrested them because they 
looked suspicious.
The accused’s ages ranged between 16 and 42.
Two of the accused, Doto Saidi (30) and Salama 
Mohamed (18) entered the dock with their toddlers.
In cross examination, Betty Jonas (accused num­
ber 15)caused laughterwhcnshcaskcd: “why did you 
arrest women only and not men as well?”
Another accused, 34 year old Zaina Masanika 
claimed that police arrested her on her way back from 
a movie adding that the police tore up her ticket at the 
remand prison.
Adjourning hearing of a case to this morning, 
Magistrate Masanchc ordered that all the accused be 
remanded in custody. A number of the accused broke 
into tears asking to be granted bails.
The first accused in the case Doto Saidi alleged in
her defence that she was arrested at Kinondoni while 
she was on her way to see her relatives, ...
Objecting to the allegations by the prosecution side 
that she (Doto) managed to survive through “beg­
ging” from men, she claimed that it was impossible 
for her to beg at that stage when she was breast feeding 
her very small child.
She further claimed that police who conducted 
the overnight swoop “just ordered me to go into the
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land-rover and when I wanted to know why I should 
board into the police vehicle, I was beaten and 
ordered to obey what they were telling me”......
Submitting her defence Safarani Nassoro who is 
the oldest accused claimed that she was arrested as she 
was returning to Kisutu from Empress Cinema hall 
where she had gone for a movie which starts at 9.15 
p.m.
She said she was neither a loiterer nor a “beggar” 
because she was employed by the owner of a private 
salt packing company in the city and “earned 840/= 
per month”
However Presiding Resident Magistrate, Ndugu 
Joseph Masanche, told the accused that she was the 
eldest accused in the case and considering her age, he 
asked why she frequented cinema halls during awk­
ward hours.
Nassor could not reply to the question by Masan­
che. Masanche: Why did you go for a movie at night? 
Nassoro: I just decided as that was the only suitable 
time for me.
Earlier the prosecution led by Superintendent of 
Police SP Elias Mahenge told the court that most of 
the accused were arrested while loitering aimlessly 
along Upanga Road, Garden Avenue and Ohio and 
Sokoine Streets.
The accused objected to the allegation claiming 
that they were arrested while waiting for buses to their 
respectable homes from the new and old Post Offices 
bus stands.
Ndugu Masanche adjourned the case to tomor­
row when it comes up for judgement. The accused are 
remanded........
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Nineteen out of the 23 women charged with loiter­
ing have been sentenced to terms ranging from three 
months to one year in prison.
Principal Resident Magistrate Joseph Masanche 
acquitted tour of the accused after finding them not 
guilty of the charge.
Pronouncing judgement on the nineteen, Magis­
trate Masanche said the women were rounded up 
following a tip to the police that prostitution was on 
the increase in Dar cs Salaam.
He said the reasons advanced by the nineteen ac­
cused were unacceptable, and therefore they were 
guilty of the charge.
Superintendent of Police Elias Mahenge, asked 
the court to hand out stiff sentences, saying prostitu­
tion was currently on the increase in the city, so was 
the spread of diseases, associated with prostitution.
In mitigation, the accused, except the youngest, 
said they had young children and relatives depended 
on them and that they were also jobless. Some of the 
accused said that they were suffering from dysentery.
Some of the accused laughed while others cried as 
the sentence was pronounced.
One of the accused Teddy Peter (19) was sen­
tenced to one year imprisonment as she had previ­
ously been convicted on the same offence by the 
Kivukoni Resident Magistrate’s Court.
One sixteen-year-old-girl was sentenced to one- 
year probation.
One of the significant points to emerge from this story is the 
way the court shifted the burden of proving their innocence on the 
accused which of course is contrary to the known rules of onus of 
proof.
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Another piece of legislation directed against the marginalised 
population with little regard for their rights and freedoms is the 
Resettlement of Offenders Act, 1969 (no. 8). The original objec­
tive of the Act was to resettle ‘habitual offenders’ and rehabilitate 
and reintegrate them in society. The legislation, however, does not 
define habitual offenders.
Any person who has been convicted of a scheduled offence can 
be ordered to be resettled by the Minister of Home Affairs pro­
vided such order is made within thirty days of the determination 
of the sentence either by effluxion of time or otherwise (s.4). 
Persons who are the subject of a deportation order under the 
Deportation Ordinance, or the Witchcraft Ordinance, may also be 
subject to a resettlement order.
Four resettlement camps were established and three are still in 
operation .25 All these camps are in the same compounds as 
ordinary prisons. Inmates are not treated differently either.
On a habeas corpus application, in the case of Samwel Kubeja 
v R26, Mroso, J. observed that it was unlawful to confine a ‘settler’ 
behind barbed wire guarded by armed prison officers and keep 
him under detention in custody pending resettlement. In that case, 
the Officer-in-charge and the State Attorney had explained to the 
court that it was the usual practice to confine settlers under such 
conditions for at least a year before they were allowed to lead 
normal lives in the camps. These stringent conditions were 
necessary because of the high incidence of escapes, they ex­
plained. The officer-in-charge cited the directions of the Principal 
Commissioner of Prisons [Ref. HQC. 57/XIII/88 of 18th July, 
1981] as his authority. The Judge perused those directives and 
declared them to be ultra vires, to the extent that they imposed con­
ditions of confinement contrary to the parent Act and were in 
breach of the freedom of the individual.
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‘It cannot be said too often that the freedom of the 
individual is sacrosanct within the confines of the 
law. It follows that an individual must not be deprived 
of his freedom more than the law clearly stipulates. ’27
Shaidi, in his research of the camps, noted, as a matter of fact, 
that the camps had become ordinary detention camps used to 
victimise, rather than rehabilitate, alleged offenders. In practice, 
groups of people on mere suspicion would be served with ‘reset­
tlement orders’ which did not even specify reasons for such 
orders. In some cases, he found that the ‘settlers’ were without 
previous convictions and some of them were elderly persons. ‘In 
some cases’, Shaidi observes, ‘one feels that the Act was invoked 
to obtain the detention of the people who were thought to have 
committed offences, but there was no sufficient evidence to get a 
conviction in a court of law. ’28 Shaidi concludes:
From our observations it can be said that the resettle­
ment centres are operating as punitive institutions, 
just like ordinary prisons. The suspects are rounded 
up unexpectedly, put in ordinary prisons pending 
their transfer to the centres. They get no time to settle 
their domestic chores, causing embarassmcnt and un­
necessary problems to the suspect and his family. 
Although theoretically his family had the option of 
joining him, there is no time for discussing and 
planning for such an event. In the end, the whole thing 
becomes a mockery in attempting to ‘resettle’ a per­
son in the absence of his family, and under conditions 
of captivity. We cannot train a man for freedom under 
such conditions.29
38
The Act itself, in more than one way, encroaches on fundamen­
tal freedoms now enshrined in the Constitution. But the practice 
of the high echelons of the state, as Kubeja’s case cited above 
vividly illustrates, do not exhibit even a modicum of conscious­
ness of, and respect for, the freedoms of a citizen.
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CHAPTER THREE
LEGAL BUT ILLEGITIMATE COERCION - II
A. FORCED LABOUR
Forced labour was prohibited towards the end of colonialism in 
the Employment Ordinance, Cap.366, although excepting what it 
called ‘minor communal services’. These ‘services’ were neither 
‘minor’ nor ‘communal’. In practice, they involved what in the 
colonial parlance was called, ‘tribal turn-outs’, involving thou­
sands of men putting in tens of thousands of man-days every year 
to build the infrastructure of the colonial economy .1 
With independence, a new exception was added to the definition 
o f ‘forced labour’ which is still applicable. Thus ‘forced labour’ 
does not include ‘any work to be performed by a person allotted 
or occupying land in accordance with customary law ... in order 
to comply with any lawful requirement of a local authority as to 
the cultivation of such land ...’.2 This is a euphemism to provide 
legal authority for the so-called ‘minimum acreage laws’ under 
which peasants in rural areas, on pain of imprisonment, are re­
quired to cultivate certain acreage of food crops and cash crops.
Interestingly, while Article 25(3) of the Union Constitution 
outlaws forced labour, it makes certain exceptions. A free trans­
lation of Article 25(3) would read:
For the purpose of this Article, and in the Constitution 
as a whole, no labour shall be construed as forced or 
oppressive, if such labour, in accordance with the law,
is:
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(a) labour whose performance is required in pursu­
ance of a judgment or order of a court;
(b) labour which is necessarily required to be per­
formed by members of any armed forces in due 
fulfilment of their duties;
(c) labour which any person may be required to 
perform in a state of emergency or calamity 
threatening the life or well-being of the commu­
nity;
(d) labour or any services which form part of:
(i) normal civic obligations to ensure the well­
being of a community;
(ii) compulsory nation-building in accordance 
with the law;
(iii) national efforts to mobilise human resources 
in the interests of the national economy and 
to ensure national development and produc­
tivity.
The exceptions in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d)(i) are standard, 
and accepted by international instruments, such as the Interna­
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (see Article 
8(3)) and the ILO Convention on Forced or Compulsory Labour 
(no. 29; Article 2(2)). However, clauses d (ii) and (iii) are 
controversial. The ILO Convention on the Abolition of Forced 
Labour, 1957 (no. 105), which has been ratified by Tanzania, 
specifically obliges any member country ratifying the Conven­
tion to ‘suppress and not to make use of any form of lorced or
44
compulsory labour -...  (b) as a method of mobilising and using 
labour for purposes of economic development;’. It is submitted 
that (d)(ii) and (iii) above squarely fall within this prohibition. We 
would suggest that d(ii) and (iii) should be narrowly construed by 
courts as simply further elaborating d(i) rather than adding any­
thing substantially new, so as to harmonise the constitutional 
provisions with the treaty obligations of the country. If this inter­
pretation is accepted, the compulsory cultivation by-laws and 
other by-laws made pursuant to the Human Resources Deploy­
ment legislation (to be discussed below) would be considered 
unconstitutional. Needless to say a closer scrutiny of the human 
resources deployment legislation shows that it is contrary to many 
rights and freedoms (right to equality and equal treatment before 
the law, Article 13; right to personal liberty, Article 15; right to 
privacy, Article 16; freedom of movement, Article 17; freedom to 
choose one’s profession or job, Article 23; etc.) enshrined in the 
Bill of Rights, and indeed runs contrary to the very spirit of the Bill 
of Rights.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the Zanzibar Constitution 
of 1984 prohibits forced labour (Article 22(2)) without excep­
tions.
We now turn to discuss the legislation dealing with the so- 
called deployment of human resources.
* * *
The Human Resources Deployment Act, 1983 (no.6) adds 
further ammunition to the armoury o f ‘forced labour’ legislation. 
In wide-ranging powers, the Minister is permitted to take a census 
of all people, identify ‘unemployed’ and ‘non-productive’ labour 
and ‘make arrangements which will provide for a smooth, co­
ordinated transfer and subsequent employment of unemployed
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residents’.3 The Minister is also given a blank cheque under which 
he can arrange for the deployment of the persons ‘chargeable with 
or previously convicted’ of being ‘idle and disorderly’ persons 
and ‘rogues and vagabonds’.4 The implications of such a provi­
sion for the potential violations of the rights of the people - and 
obviously lower classes - arc enormous. The Legal Aid Commit­
tee of the Faculty of Law, in its comment on these provisions, 
observed:
Anyone who is actually found guilty and convicted of 
being an idle and disorderly person or a rogue and 
vagabond is caught by the Minister’s net of rehabili­
tation and full deployment. And as wc have already 
seen, the category of idle and disorderly and rogues 
and vagabonds includes unemployed workers as well 
as workers who may have absented themselves from 
their place of work. But the provision goes even 
further. A person need not be proved guilty and 
convicted by a court of law of being an idle and 
disorderly or a rogue and vagabond. For anyone who 
is “chargeable” with the said offences can be caught 
in the Minister’s net.
Even to a lawyer, the concept of persons “charge­
able” with a given offence is a strange innovation and 
novel indeed. In law, there are two concepts and 
eategories which are known and which can be objec­
tively ascertained. The category of people who are 
actually charged before a court of law can be ascer­
tained so can a category of people who are convicted 
before a court of law. But how does one ascertain, 
identify and verify a category of people who arc 
chargeable with a given offence? Surely, the practical 
implication of such a concept is to open flood-gates to 
subjectivism, arbitrariness, personal whims and in-
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deed prejudices of some implementor somewhere.
It is not far-fetched to say that virtually any citizen 
of this country can fall within the category of being 
chargeable with the offences under sections 176 and 
177 of the Penal Code; therefore brand-able as idle 
and disorderly or rogue and vagabond and therefore 
subject to being rehabilitated and deployed by the 
Minister! Read literally, this law seeks to punish po­
tential idlers and disorderly persons or rogues and 
vagabonds.5
The central organs that are supposed to effect the provisions of 
the Human Resources Deployment Act are local authorities, and 
they have already begun to do so in what can only be described as 
draconian by-laws. Since the colonial era, by-laws have existed 
providing for forced cultivation of certain specified minimum of 
food and cash crops, depending on particular areas. These laws 
have been on and off used by local administrators as and when 
deemed expedient. Under these by-laws, hundreds of thousands 
of peasants arc fined and imprisoned besides being harassed and 
humiliated.6 As one peasant put it:
I know what is best for me. I do not need imposed 
advice. Most of the young men who advise us have no 
farms and have no farming experience. They just sit 
in offices ... If I fail to meet my needs it is me and my 
family which will suffer and no body else, so the 
government should leave us a lone... The people to be 
prosecuted are thieves, burglars and murderers in 
towns, not us.7
But the ‘government of the people’, as the Tanzanian state is 
fond of declaring itself, thinks otherwise. Commenting on the
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prosecution o f some peasants in Mafia, the 
government’s mouth-pieee, the Daily News8, ar­
gued in its editorial:
The two hundred and thirty one individuals in Mafia 
are in the process of being prosecuted for neglecting 
their shambas. To some, this may appear harsh, 
arbitrary and even a miscarriage of justice. It is not: 
the individuals concerned arc being prosecuted under 
bye-laws made by the development council of the 
area in question. The former local government 
councils also used to make various by-laws in accor­
dance with the needs of their respective areas. Those 
who contravened those by-laws used to be charged 
... The present development councils are people’s 
instruments of development. It would be a gross 
abdication of responsibility on their part if they left 
development to stagnate or to be undermined by the 
bad behaviour of certain individuals under their ju ­
risdiction. It is a grave abuse of freedom and crime 
against society for any Tanzanian to have a piece of 
land, cultivate it, plant it with crons and then leave 
those crops to die half-way by refusing to weed the 
shamba. This is what the 231 individuals in Mafia 
have done. They deserve to be punished.
That ordinary economic activity has to be enforced by criminal 
sanctions is much more a comment on the character of law and 
state that rule the neo-colonies than an expression of ‘people’s in­
struments ’ cajoling peasants to earn their own livelihood!
Be that as it may, since passage of the Human Resources 
Deployment Act and the regulations9 thereunder, there has been 
a spate of by-laws to enforce its provisions. These regulations and
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by-laws require cell leaders to keep elaborate records of residents 
(i.e. able-bodied persons above the age of fifteen years) in relevant 
areas: names, family details, employment status, etc. The law 
requires residents to notify their cell leaders of any visitors and 
guests received by them. Cell leaders must be notified of and 
record all departures, deaths, marriages, births and any other 
changes in the status or movements of the resident’s family. If 
these regulations and by-laws were to function in practice, the 
situation could easily be described as bordering on a police state, 
and in gross violation of the various freedoms in the Constitution. 
Thanks to the notorious inefficiency of the state’s bureaucratic 
machinery, however, such a system can hardly function on the 
ground. But on the other hand, its selective application, or the 
threat of it, does become a nightmare of harassment and humili­
ation while obstructing daily, legitimate activities of citizens, 
particularly in rural areas.
Some District Councils have gone even further and made self- 
help and community work compulsory and legally enforceable, 
without any pretense of respecting the ‘due process ’ provisions of 
the Constitution. Thus the Mwanga District Council (Self-help 
and Community Development) By-laws, 198410 require every 
resident, except those exempted11, to participate in self-help and 
community work so designated from time to time by the Council 
or Village Committees.
Any person who is bound by any provisions of these 
by-laws to participate in the self help and community 
development works through any means and failed to 
do so, the village council shall require him to pay a fine 
of shillings 200/- or extort his property equivalent to 
shillings 200/-; if the said property exceeds shillings 
200/- shall be kept in safe custody and require the 
owner to pay the said fine in two days time. On failure
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to pay that fine, the property extorted shall be sold by 
village council by auction and deduct shillings 200/- 
in favour of the village as a fine and remit the exceed­
ing amount to the owner.12
This extra-ordinary provision is a dramatic reflection of the 
total disregard of even elcmentry provisions and principles under­
lying the Constitution or rule of law. The legislature (the Village 
Council, the District Council’s delegatee) is at the same time the 
judge, who imposes punishment without any trial and executes it 
by distress, thus also acting as the sherriff. To add insult to the 
injury, the next provision declares such ‘extortion’ a ‘justand final 
punishment’!13
As many researchers have noted, it is a fact of daily life that the 
implementation of the so-called deployment exercises, appropri­
ately called in Swahili ‘Nguvu-Kazi’ [literally forced labour?!], 
are a long nightmare of harassment, beating, extortion of bribes 
etc. from ordinary citizens by the organs and officials of the state.14
B. DETENTION AND DEPORTATION
The Preventive Detention Act, 1962, Cap.490, and the Deportation 
Ordinance, Cap.38, allow virtually indefinite incarceration of 
individuals without trial. The former is a post-independence stat­
ute while the latter has been taken over from colonial times. That 
the two exist side by side, and, as we shall see, have been used 
alternatively and concurrently, is in itself a comment on the 
continuity between colonial despotism and neo-colonial authori­
tarianism.
The official rationale behind Preventive Detention, as inces­
santly proclaimed in media and speeches, is that it is a measure
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against a few elements bent on disrupting the security and 
stability of the state and the people of Tanzania. This propaganda 
seems to have been so successful that many forget all the empirical 
evidence of the last twenty-five years, which shows that the Act 
has been used largely to intimidate and politically demobilise 
initiatives of the large masses of the people. Even worse, it has 
been used by police to short-circuit the procedures of the court 
against alleged smugglers, saboteurs, gongo-drinkers etc.15 Yet it 
continues to exist on the statute book, and even after the 1984 Bill 
of Rights, there has been obvious reluctance to repeal it.
The Act empowers the President to detain a person who, in the 
President's opinion, is conducting himself, or to prevent him from 
conducting himself, ‘so as to be dangerous to peace and good 
order in any part of Tanganyika, or is acting in a manner prejudi­
cial to the defence of Tanganyika or the security of the State’.16 
Before 1985, such order could not be challenged in a court of law, 
although it was required that the detainee be informed of the 
reasons for his detention within fifteen days.
The Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1985, (no.2) 
gives a detained person right to challenge its legality in a court of 
law on any ground. Furthermore, if a person is not informed of 
the grounds for his detention within fifteen days, he shall be 
released immediately. The Act which previously did not apply to 
Zanzibar, has been amended to apply ‘throughout the United 
Republic’.
So far the amendment has not been tested in court. In one case, 
though, where the detainees had challenged their detention and 
the amendment may have come under judicial scrutiny, the Re­
public produced a rescission order on the day of hearing and 
informed the court that the detainees were being held under the
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Deportation Ordinance. The Judge therefore dismissed the peti­
tion on the ground that the subject-matter of the application, the 
detention order, had ceased to exist.17 In a number of cases, the 
state has used the Deportation Ordinance to detain a person whose 
detention under the Preventive Detention Act was challenged or 
whose release was ordered by the court for some irregularity.18
Where detentions have been challenged in courts, the typical 
attitude hitherto has been to see if the order bears the Public Seal 
and the signature of the President.19 Once that is shown, courts 
have refused to go beyond. As a matter of fact they have refused 
to invalidate a detention order even where it has been shown that 
reasons were not given within fifteen days or that the detainee was 
not shown the order on arrest.20 In this regard, the courts have been 
over-positivist. Where a bold judge has dared to free a person 
because the order was signed by the Vice-President, and not the 
President, as in the case of Ndcnai21, such persons have been 
immediately arrested on stepping out of the court and detained 
under the Deportation Ordinance.
It appears that the common practice of the police has been to 
detain a person first and then obtain a detention order from the 
President. Thus in the case of Ex parte Saidi Hilali22, Hilali was 
arrested and detained on 11 September 1979 while the detention 
order was signed on 2 October 1979. In Muhidin Saidi Gongo v 
R23, Gongo was detained in September 1979 while the order was 
dated three years later, 3 November 1982. Again in the case of Ex 
parte Mapalala and Udindo24, their counsel complained that the 
applicants had been detained prior to 30 October 1986, the date of 
the order. The worse happened in March 1983 during the ‘opera­
tion’ against the so-called ‘economic saboteurs’, when people 
were detained en masse under the Preventive Detention Act. It is 
believed the police had blank orders signed for them wherein they
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A month after the ‘operation’ against ‘raekeleers and cco- 
nomie saboteurs’ began, some 1,139 people had been detained 
under the Preventive Detention Act.2S Later a spceial law, the 
Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act, 1983 (no. 9)26, was 
passed creating spceial tribunals to try alleged saboteurs. And the 
then President, Mwalimu Nyercre, went on record arguing that the 
‘racketeers’ engaged lawyers to ‘twist the law in their favour’ and 
therefore the government hesitated to take the ‘culprits’ to courts 
of law.27
Besides the Preventive Detention Act, District and Regional 
Commissioners under the District Commissioners Act, 1962, 
Cap.466, and the Regions and Regional Commissioners Act, 
1962, Cap. 461, respectively, have powers to arrest and detain a 
person for forty-eight hours if he has ‘reason to believe that [such] 
person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the 
public tranquility, or to do any act that may probably occasion a 
breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquility, and that such 
breach cannot be prevented otherwise than by detaining such 
person in custody,...’. These powers, too, have not been without 
abuse, as thecasestudy bclowshows. Interestingly, in a Paliamen- 
tary debate the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General 
opined that such powers of detention were not in breach of the Bill 
of Rights28 for, it was argued, individual rights had to be balanced 
against public interests.
In an amazing speech reported in the government paper re­
cently2'', the former President of the Republic and the Chairman of 
the ruling party, Chamacha Mapinduzi, Mwalimu Nyerere, called 
upon Regional Commissioners in Zanzibar and Pemba to use 
their powers of detention to detain political ‘detractors’ (term used
just filled in names.
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to describe those who have dared voice demands lor greater auton­
omy for Zanzibar and question the highhanded actions of the Party 
or leaders). He advised them that they could renew ‘the 48 hour 
detention of a given culprit as often as necessary’ and that under 
the law ‘RCs may seek presidential approval to hold the culprit for 
longer period.’ (This newspaper report has not been rebutted).
Wceall this speech ‘amazing’ for the disregard, to say the least, 
it displays towards law, its spirit and the freedom of the individ­
ual. Firstly, as a Chairman of the Party, the speaker, with due 
respect, had no jurisdiction to issue such directives. Secondly, the 
power of detention referred to could only be that stipulated in 
section 79 of the Zanzibar’s Local Government (District and 
Urban Authorities) Act, 1986 (no.3) in which case it falls squarely 
within the jurisdiction of Zanzibar and its President. Thirdly, no 
respectable court would countenance renewal of detention ‘as 
often as necessary’ under section 79 (as was apparently advised by 
the Chairman of the Party) for it would amount to abuse of power, 
even if a court was to hold that the Regional Commissioner’s 
power of arrest and detention did not offend the Bill of Rights in 
the first place. And, finally, in law, neither the President of the 
Union nor of Zanzibar has authority to approve the detention of a 
person detained by a Regional Commissioner beyond 48 hours.
Deportation
The Deportation Ordinance empowers the President to deport any 
person from one place in the country to another if he is satisfied 
that such person is conducting himself ‘so as to be dangerous to 
peace and good order in any part of Tanganyika, or is endeavour­
ing to excite enmity between the people of Tanganyika and the 
Republic, or is intriguing against the Republic’s power and au­
thority in Tanganyika ..A30 While awaiting his deportation, such
54
person may be detained in custody or prison ‘until lit opportunity 
for his deportation occurs’.31 Deportation orders cannot be chal­
lenged in a court of law.
Once again, the police have used this to detain people that they 
feel cannot be charged in a court for lack of evidence, and many 
times as sheer harassment. Alleged cattle rustlers and other of­
fenders have been detained and deported in their hundreds under 
this legislation.32 It has been used against persons who have dared 
question the political system (e.g. Mapalala case). A Muslim 
sheikh was deported from Dar es Salaam to Zanzibar under it for 
‘unspecified’ reasons.33 The Ordinance has also been used to 
continue detaining a person whose detention has been challenged 
under the Preventive Detention Act as happened in the Ndenai and 
Mapalala cases34.
After having survived on the statute book for some forty years 
of colonialism and some twenty-eight years of independence, the 
Ordinance was declared unconstitutional by the High Court in 
1988 in a remarkable judgment delievcred by Mwalusanya, J.
In the case of Chumchua s/o Marwa v Officer i/c of Musoma 
Prison & The Attorney General, the applicant’s father, together 
with 155 others, was detained on 29/9/87 pending deportation 
from Mara to Lindi region. His son filed a habeas corpus applica­
tion five months later while his father was still under detention. 
Mwalusanya, J. considered the Deportation Ordinance in the light 
of the Bill of Rights, and particularly Article 13(6)(a), which 
enshrines the principles of natural justice of the right to be heard 
and the right to appeal. He argued that on both these grounds the 
Deportation Ordinanee was offensive, and therefore unconstitu­
tional and declared it to be null and void.
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The Judge also considered the effect of the derogation clauses, 
i.e. Article 30(2). Arguing that a Bill of Rights must be given 
‘generous and purposive construction’ in favour of fundamental 
rights, Mwalusanya, J. held that the burden was on the state to 
show that the offending legislation could be rescued under the 
derogation or limitation clauses. He said:
[T]he overriding of rights and duties of the individ­
ual by rights and duties of the community [stipulated 
in Article 30(2)] does not entail ‘arbitrary action’ on 
the part of the community or its institutions. ...[T]he 
restriction to protect communal rights has to be done 
according to law. But it is not enough for the party 
supporting the legislation to be able to point to ‘a law’ 
in the sense simply of an Act duly passed by the 
legislature. If the Act relied on should be declared 
inoperative as violating a fundamental constitutional 
right it is not Taw’.35
This approach is undoubtedly most refreshing and one hopes will 
be upheld by the highest court, the Court of Appeal, in an appro­
priate case.
* * *
We now move on to some case studies which illustrate the use 
of the legislation discussed in this section in practice.
Case Study 2: Deportation
Saidi Hilali, with a number of other persons, was charged in the 
District Court of Utete with offences relating to unlawful dealing 
in government trophies and failure to report the possession of 
government trophies. While the case was still pending and they
56
were out on bail, Hilali was arrested on 11 September 1979 and 
held in custody. In an application for habeas corpus filed on his 
behalf, the Commissioner of Prisons did not produce him in court, 
as the law requires him to do, nor did he appear in person, but 
simply sent a photocopy of a deportation order signed by the 
President and dated 2 October 1979. The said order, among others, 
contained Hilali’s name and they were supposed to be deported to 
an unspecified place. The judge threw up his hands in helplessness 
holding the detention to be valid and unchallengeable in courts.36 
He expressed hope that such powers will not be abused! The Judge 
continued:
It is conceivable that certain law enforcing authorities 
may resort to deportation orders as mere convenience 
even in a matter which could be a normal criminal 
case for the courts. Sometimes, if the several applica­
tions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus that have been dealt 
by the High Court in the recent months are anything 
to go by, one does get an uneasy feeling or suspicion 
that there is possibly a coveted desire by certain 
officials in the government to demonstrate power and 
authority by rushing to the President for deportation 
orders. I prefer to say no more on these anxieties.37
Case Study 3: Detention
Two brothers, Dushom Susa Yamo and John Yamo, were de­
tained on 30/3/85 and remanded in Tarimc prison on allegations 
of possessing ammunition but no charges were preferred against 
them. When their houses were searched nothing illegal had been 
found in them. The same persons had been detained in July 1984 
and released in December 1984, after their brother had com­
plained to the Regional Commissioner. This time around their
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brother filed a habeas corpus application.38 The Commissioner of 
Prisons did not appear before the court but the two detainees were 
brought by a prison warden. John Yamo stated their plight thus:
Last year in July on 11th I was arrested. I was 
remanded till 16/12/84 when we were released. On 
30/3/85 I was arrested again and sent to Tarime Police 
station where I was locked up for five days. After five 
days I was released on 5/4/85. I was told to go home 
but I was required to report back on 9/4/85.1 reported 
as I was told by O.C.D. Tarime. When I reported as 
I was told, the O.C.D. asked me whether last year I had 
been arrested. I told him that I had been arrested and 
I was released by himself. The O.C.D. told me that my 
problem was a difficult one and I would be locked up.
The O.C.D. told me to stop “maneno” [blabbering].
Since then I have been in remand. I have not been told 
what offence I have committed.
The state attorney was given a copy of the deportation order 
which had 280 names, among which the two names of the appli­
cants also appeared. But the deportation order was dated 24 
September 1983, while the arrests had been made on 30 March 
1985, and in between they had been arrested once and released. 
Since the relevant government officials did not appear, there was 
no one to give explanation. The Judge assumed that their first 
arrest and detention must have been under the deportation order, 
butsince they had been released that order lapsed. And since there 
was no fresh order, the second arrest and detention were illegal. 
He ordered their immediate release.
What is probably most frightening about this case study is the 
number of people involved. True, these two brought the applica­
tion to court through their brother, who happened to work in the 
Ministry of Justice, and were fortunate to be released. But what
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about the other 278 who were part of the original deportation 
order? No one knows and no one would know; nor is it the court’s 
business to enquire after those who arc not before it!
Case Study 4: Detention by Regional Commissioner
In the case of Hamisi Masisi & 6 Others v R y>, the accused had 
been granted bail on 14/12/78 by the Resident Magistrate of 
Musoma, and two days later the same Magistrate cancelled the 
bail although the state attorney, appearing on behalf of the Diretor 
of Public Prosecution, had produced no fresh reasons for his 
application to cancel the bail. The Magistrate was, however, 
informed by the accused’s counsel that his clients had been 
detained by the Regional Commissioner soon after they had been 
released on bail. The Magistrate therefore felt that it would be 
futile to grant them bail again, since the Regional Commissioner 
might rearrcst the applicants. Furthermore, he wanted to avoid 
what he called ‘conflict of powers’ between the executive and the 
judiciary.
On review by the High Court, Mlalila, J. deplored the action of 
the Regional Commissioner as being unlawful and a gross inter­
ference with the judicial process and the independence of the 
judiciary. Commenting on the cancellation of the bail by the 
Magistrate, Mfalila, J. said:
The Resident Magistrate was wrong... . He is not 
supposed to make judicial decisions on expediency.
His is a judicial office in which he is supposed to act 
only in accordance with the law despite any irrelevant 
pressures that might be applied on him. I note with 
regret the helplessness which the Resident Magis­
trate exhibited in the face of these pressures from the 
executive. So long as the executive is manned by
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ordinary human beings who are bound to exhibit 
excesses in their enthusiasm to serve the Republic, he 
should expect such conflicts and pressures, and his 
duty is not to succumb as he did, but to stand firm in 
defence not only of the people brought to his Court, 
but also the Constitution and practices of the United 
Republic as by law established. ...
Next I will consider the question posed by the 
Resident Magistrate namely whether it is appropriate 
for the executive branch of Government in this case a 
Regional Commissioner to order detention of an 
accused person for an offence the same accused is 
charged with in Court in disregard of the Court’s order 
that the same accused be admitted to bail. Quite 
clearly the answer is no ... . [I]t having been decided 
to take the applicants to a Court of Law, then only the 
rules applicable in the administration of justice be­
came applicable and in their application the Court 
concerned should not be under any influence or pres­
sure from any quarter, in other words the entire 
judicial machinery, the prosecution, the defence, the 
Court and the subject of the proceedings, i.e. the 
accused persons should be free from harassment 
however well intentioned. This is the meaning behind 
the concept of the independence of the judiciary. This 
concept is part of the laws of the United Republic.40
* * *
Finally, together with the enactment of the Bill of Rights, the 
Preventive Detention Act was amended. Apparently, the legality 
of a detention order can now be challenged before a court of law 
on any ground; the detainee has to be given reasons for his 
detention within fifteen days, if not, he has to be released and the
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Act, which previously did not apply to Zanzibar, is now made 
applicable to the whole of the United Republic. What looked like 
some ‘gains’ have been somewhat nullified. Be that as it may, it 
remains to be seen whether (1) with these amendments the Pre­
ventive Detention Act will be accepted by the judiciary as within 
the Bill of Rights41 and if accepted (2) how far the judiciary will 
go in its scrutiny of a detention order when such an order is 
challenged. Further, as we saw in the Mapalala case above, there 
seem to be some signs that the state will continue to use other 
legislation, such as the Deportation Ordinance (may be after some 
amendment), in spite of Mwalusanya, J.’s strictures in Chumchua42, 
to defeat these amendments in the Preventive Detention Act.
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the minimum standards though it still remains to be tested 
in courts as to whether that is all that has to be covered in this 
delicate field’, (p. 14 of the cyclostyled Judgment). It will be 
a step backwards from the Constitutional Debate of 1983, 
which overwhelmingly came out against preventive deten­
tion, if the courts were to hold the amended Preventive Deten­
tion Act as being consistent with the Bill of Rights.
42 Although Mwalusanya, J. declared the Ordinance invalid on 
narrow grounds of infringing the right to be heard and the 
right to appeal, it is submitted that the whole of the Ordinance 
is inconsistent with several freedoms and rights stipulated in 
the Bill of Rights such as the freedom of movement and right 
of choice of residence (Article 17), right to be heard by an 
impartial judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal (Article 13(3), 
etc., and therefore cannot be rescued by some amendments.
66
CHAPTER FOUR
ILLEGAL COERCION
This refers to the use of coercion, depriving a citizen of his right 
to life or liberty, by an individual member of an organ of the state 
beyond that authorised by law. Such incidences happen on two 
levels. The first level is where the militia and the traditional army, 
occasionally national servicemen, and usually the police, come 
into contact with citizens, particularly when on patrol duties, at 
road-blocks or when searching and arresting etc., on suspicion. 
Here there are numerous reported and unreported cases of beating 
(up to death), harassment and molestation. It seems the police and 
militia on patrol are heavily armed, trigger-happy and reckless 
with their arms, as a number of court cases show1. In the case of 
R v Abdallah Bakari Lugendo2, the accused militiaman on 
normal patrol duty was armed with a she-gun which had twenty- 
eight live bullets. He shot dead an alleged hooligan who had 
attempted to escape. The bullet got the deceased in the stomach. 
Sentencing him to four years imprisonment on his own plea of 
guilty to the charge of manslaughter, the Court observed:
Most unfortunately instances of militiamen becom­
ing trigger happy are on the increase and this must be 
curbed. It is admitted that the deceased misbehaved 
himself but at the same time had the accused been on 
the alert all the time as he was expected to be this 
incident would have been avoided. Secondly the 
accused could have fired a warning shot first and then 
aim at the legs.3
The same court in another case sentenced a 23 year old 
militiaman to death for killing instantly two persons who had
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refused to stop when ordered to do so.4 The Judge described the 
action as ‘reckless’.
There are also numerous complaints against ‘development 
levy’ collectors who are alleged to harass, beat up and generally 
molest people in the course of collecting this hated tax. ( ‘Devel­
opment levy’ is a kind of poll tax which was reintroduced amidst 
protests by parliamentarians in 1986.) The following story in the 
government newspaper Daily News reporting a complaint by a 
parliamentarian is typical:
The Government has been asked to throw an eye on 
Liwale District council officials who in their efforts to 
collect levy harass, beat up and detain people for long 
hours without food or water.
Lt. Col. Abbas Ngayaga (Liwale) told the National 
Assembly in Dar es Salaam yesterday that the people 
of Liwale were disheartened because the Government 
seems to approve such acts.
He said he had in the last budget session pleaded 
with the Prime Minister and first Vice-President, 
Ndugu Joseph Warioba, to take corrective measures 
against Liwale Council officials, but up to now noth­
ing had been done.
In a terse speech, the MP said council officials 
ordered militia men to search for levy defaulters in 
villages. But upon arrival in the villages, the militia 
men did not bother to contact village leaders but went 
into people’s homes and arrested them indiscrimi­
nately, he charged.
He said sometimes they follow women in shambas 
and arrest them or beat up children found in the homes 
without their parents.
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He said the people of Liwale, like all Tanzanians, 
wanted to play a part in the country’s development by 
paying levy ‘but how can we like the levy when our 
mothers, wives and children are manhandled’, he 
asked.
He said besides, the Liwale Council was doing 
very little to promote developing the district. He said 
the money collected from the people as levy was 
mainly used for administrative purposes.5
*  *  =K
The second level is where a person has been arrested and held 
in custody for interrogation or for some other reason, and is 
subjected to torture, beating and harassment. This is known to 
occur, and occur quite often, but is not usually reported and, it 
appears, the violators are rarely prosecuted by the state.
In the table below I have picked 28 incidences of the first kind 
reported in the Daily News between 1981-87. In the majority of 
the cases these reports found their way into the newspaper at all 
because the culprits were actually prosecuted in the High Court. 
Even then there are numerous cases, particularly in lower courts 
and in the High Court stations other than Dar es Salaam, which do 
not get reported, and numerous others which never see the doors 
of a court-room. One knows and hears through the grapevine 
about them, and has also witnessed them in daily life, either pro­
fessionally or as a citizen.
Over the last two years a spate of letters from citizens com­
plaining of police beating and harassment have found their way 
into the newspapers.6 In one letter a reader enquired as to what had 
been done to the policemen and national servicemen who, on 
November 16, 1987 had rounded up some residents of
69
Mwanayamala in Dar es Salaam. They were armed with ‘ machine 
guns, clubs, army belts and Police dogs...’
We were beaten and taken as prisoners to the CCM 
office at Mwananyamala (Kambangwa) where we 
were beaten again and taken to Oysterbay police 
Station. At Oysterbay police Station we were piled up 
at the back yard and in the morning they checked our 
I.D. cards and later allowed to go!7
In another story, 12 policemen took upon themselves to raid 
Msasani, a suburb of Dar es Salaam, beating viciously residents 
and passers-by, apparently as the measure of revenge, because one 
of them had been beaten up the previous night. Some ten people 
were severely injured.8
Thus the table is a far cry from being representative, especially 
in terms of the extent of the abuse. It is only the tip of the ice-berg. 
The ice-berg must be massive for, even the otherwise complacent 
government officials, have been occasionally forced to sound 
warnings.9
On the other hand, I believe, in other respects the table is a fair 
representation of various aspects of this violation. It occurs in 
villages as much as towns; in villages probably often on a more 
massive level - but unknown - while in towns more on individual 
level. Victims of these violations cut across all sections of the 
population but, obviously, the abuse affects much more the lower 
classes who, socially, economically and politically, have the least 
clout and virtually no social status, which are the biggest deter­
rents in such cases. Furthermore, these incidences are not simply 
minor irritants or harassment but gruesome beating, torture and 
deaths. In the incidences recorded in the table, there were over 40 
per cent of deaths. Very often the beating and torture involve
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VIOLATION OF LIFE THROUGH H IE  ILLEGAL USE OF FORCE 
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degrading and inhuman treatment such as squeezing of a male’s 
private parts, beating with rifle butts or striking on the head with 
truncheons. One letter in a newspaper, for instance, complained 
that the male police in Mufindi had investigated women workers 
of the paper factory at Mgololo by undressing them. The writer 
described this as ‘beastly’.10
Finally, as the table shows, the organs of the state most 
involved at this level are the militiamen, the traditional army and 
the police. It is interesting that, particularly in villages, Party 
people - village chairmen and secretaries - also get involved in this 
type of behaviour, very often in their capacity as the leaders of the 
militia and implementors of various government and state ‘opera­
tions’ and directives. The following case studies have been 
selected to illustrate what is represented generally in the table.
Case Study 5: Death in Bagamoyo11
In or around February 1982, an ‘operation’ was mounted in 
Vigwaza Village, Bagamoyo District to search and ‘net’ (to use 
the official media parlance!) those who had not cultivated four 
acres of shamba in accordance with the directive of the village 
council. This ‘operation’ was a local affair. The village CCM 
chairman testified that the usual procedure was that ten-cell 
leaders would report those who had not complied to the CCM 
office and the ward secretary would then decide on the steps to be 
taken. In this particular ‘operation’, search was conducted by the 
chairman and the secretary; those apprehended were brought to 
the CCM office for interrogation while they were being guarded 
by militiamen. The militiamen had obtained truncheons from the 
local police station for the purpose.
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Two of the militiamen, including the aceused, instead of 
guarding the CCM office went on their own to conduct further 
search. They came across two persons, including the deceased, 
selling pineapples at a ‘genge’ (stall). On seeing the militiamen, 
the deceased took to heels chased by the accused. The accused 
eventually caught up with him and severely beat him with a 
truncheon. After a couple of hours the deceased died.
The accused was first charged with murder but later the charge 
of manslaughter was substituted. The court found that the search 
and arrests were lawful as they had been conducted under the 
authority of the local militia commander, the Parly Secretary. But 
the second search done by the militiamen themselves was un­
authorised. The accused was found guilty and sentenced to im­
prisonment.
It is interesting that neither the counsel nor the Court ever 
addressed their minds to the legality or otherwise of the militia per 
se which, as argued earlier, is doubtful.
Case Study 6: Tortured to Blindness12
Scarion Bruno was arrested on 23 December 1981 on suspicion 
of having encashed a cheque fraudulently. He was kept in remand 
for three days [i.e. exceeding the legal limit of 24 hours] before 
being sent to court. He was refused bail and remanded in custody 
until 11 January 1982. While in custody he was interrogated 
during which he was beaten severely. One of his interrogators hit 
him with a pistol butt hurting his eye. He was not provided with 
any medical attention. On 26 February 1982 he asked for a form 
which would allow him to get medical treatment but was refused 
one. When Bruno was released on bail he went to the Muhimbili 
hospital on his own where he was admitted on 13 January 1983 for 
a month.
72
The medical report mentioned that on admission, the patient 
had ‘an ulceration of come of his Right Eye. At that lime he could 
only perceive light’. ‘He was treated and discharged from our 
ward on 10/2/83 and continued with outpatient treatment. The 
ulcer healed with scar formation and up to now he can only 
perceive light with that eye.’ In another medical report dated 15 
August 1984 it was said: ‘He has a corneal opacity of the 
“Leucoma” grade in his right eye. He has lost all vision in his [sic! ] 
that eye. This is equivalent to 30% total permanent incapacity.’ At 
that time Bruno was 38 years old.
Around June 1984, Bruno sought assistance of the Legal Aid 
Committee of the Faculty of Law. Correspondence between the 
Committee and the Attorney General’s Office ensued. In Decem­
ber 1984 the Committee filed a plaint in the High Court but had to 
await consent of the Attorney General13 before the case could 
proceed. More correspondence ensued. While still waiting for the 
consent, Bruno ‘protested’ with his life. He died sometime in 
September 1987.14
Case Study 7: ‘Nationality’ Oppression.15
In this case ten persons of Wagunya (hailing from Tanga) and 
Wasomali (all born in different regions of Tanzania) nationalities, 
all resident for long periods in Songea and Tunduru Districts, were 
applying to the High Court at Songea for orders of certiorari and 
mandamus.16 The applications were filed against the District 
Commissioners of the Songea and Tunduru Districts and the 
District Executive Director of the Tunduru District and the Town 
Director of the Songea Town council.
The order of certiorari was meant to quash the orders of the 
District Commissioners ordering the applicants to leave Songea
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and Tunduru by 30 June 1987 and return to their ‘homes’. The 
order of mandamus was prayed against the Executive Director and 
Town Director who had refused to grant them renewal of their 
business licences for 1987/88, to grant such licences.
Before the Court the District Commissioner of Songea District 
testified that Wagunya and Wasomali ‘tribes’ were suspected of 
being involved in illegal trade in government trophies and there­
fore, on orders from the Regional Commissioner, it had been 
decided not to renew their licences. Thus put out of business, they 
were then ordered under the Townships (Removal of Undesirable 
Persons) Ordinance, Cap. 104, to leave Songea and Tunduru.
Alter reviewing the evidence before him and the applicable 
laws, Justice Rubama came to the conclusion that the authorities 
concerned had exceeded their jurisdiction and powers. That they 
had no legal authority to refuse granting of licences on racial or 
tribal grounds. Furthermore, the applicants were not caught by the 
relevant law on removals because they were not, among other 
things, persons who did not have reputable means of livelihood. 
The Judge therefore invalidated the removal orders and ordered 
the relevant authorities to consider the applicants’ applications for 
the renewal of their business licences.
Case Study 8: ‘Police in Duga-Maforoni are oppressing us’
The following is a translation of a letter which appeared in Uhuru 
on 5 December 1987. It describes in gory detail the kind of harass­
ment and molestation that villagers are subjected to in some parts 
of Tanzania.
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Brother Editor,
The Police and militia here in Duga Maforoni - on 
the border between Tanzania and Kenya - are op­
pressing us, citizens. For example, we are forced to go 
to bed before 8.00 p.m. and they ensure that water in 
the village is available only to the police station [alter 
that time].
Travellers through Duga Mafaroni are also har- 
asssed a lot by the beastly behaviour of the police. For 
instance, on October 14, 1987 lour baskets full of 
lemons were confiscated from a certain person alleg­
edly because they were supposedly from Kenya. He 
was whipped and forced to trim grass at the police 
station.
On October 20, 1987, Brother Tembo was de­
prived of his one and a half sack of second hand 
clothing while he was travelling in the Kidato bus 
which plies between Dar es Salaam and Mombasa. 
This happened in Mbuluni village. He was accused of 
‘exporting’ the goods to Kenya but then the distance 
from the place where his goods were confiscated to 
the border is some ten kilometers. And he does his 
business within five kilometers of the village where 
he lives. Now, if it is illegal to sell second hand 
clothing within a village how come such business is 
being done everywhere in Dar es Salaam?
Then, one day one girl (Mwanaidi) was thrown 
into a cell for two whole days and forced to scrub the 
Boor with her bare hands and to trim the grass in the 
station compound. She was subjected to this punish­
ment apparently because she had asked to be paid for 
her fried fish consumed by a policeman.
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On August 15, 1987 a Masai from Tanga was 
picked up because he was found with 25000/- Tanza­
nian shillings. He was brought to the police station, 
whipped and subjected to other torture. Before being 
set free he was deprived of 15000/- shillings.
A similar incident happened to a trader of Duga 
Mafaroni, Brother Chikobe, on November 8, 1987.
He was found with 30,000/- on his way to Tanga to 
buy merchandise. He was told that there was no law 
in Tanzania permitting any person, except a Bank, to 
move around with that much money. He too was 
whipped ( ‘mikia ya taa’17) and forced to cut grass in 
the station compound. And before he was set free a 
sum of 17000/- shillings was confiscated from him.
Case Study 9: The Kilombero Killings18
On 27 July 1986 some 500 sugar cane cutters at the Kilombero 
Sugar Planatations in the Morogoro Region refused to go to the 
fields demanding explanation for short payments. It is believed 
that the workers gathered at the main gate of the factory and 
prevented Company officials from entering. It is also believed that 
there was some stone-throwing and a windscreen of one official 
car was broken.
It seems that the company officials and the local police station 
sent messages to the Regional Police Headquarters in Morogoro. 
The Regional Police Commander (R.P.C.), with the approval of 
the then Regional Commissioner, immediately despatched a con- 
tigent of 10 Field Force Unit soldiers under the command of the 
Regional Crimes Officer (R.C.O.). The FFU contigent was armed 
to the teeth.
On arrival at the scene, it seems from all evidence, the FFU first
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fired some tear gas bombs, thus dispersing the crowd, and imme­
diately followed up by firing live bullets indiscriminately and 
chasing and pursuing the protestors to their places of residence 
(camps). Some four persons were killed as a result and 16 other 
severely wounded.
The tragedy sent shock-waves through the nation. It was the 
first time since independence that workers had been killed sum­
marily in a labour dispute. The news broke out in the capital city 
two days later while the Parliament was in session. The Legal Aid 
Committee of the University of Dar es Salaam, in a first public 
reaction, issued a statement condemning the wanton killings and 
calling for immediate formation of an impartial and independent 
judicial commission of inquiry which would conduct its hearings 
in public. Some members of Parliament followed suit and de­
manded explanation19.
After some two weeks, the Minister for Labour appointed a 
Tribunal to investigate. It was headed by a High Court Judge. Two 
of its mem bers came from the Department of Labour; one from the 
ruling party; one from the official trade union and one the Director 
of the Criminal Investigation Department. The Tribunal does not 
seem to have conducted its hearings in public and its report and 
recommendations have not been published. However, some of its 
findings have filtered through to researchers.
The Tribunal rejected the explanation of the FFU commanders 
that they had fired in self-defence. The Tribunal found that the 
firing was reckless and that, as a matter of fact, the FFU soldiers 
actually pursued the workers into the surrounding houses. Thus 
one person was killed while hiding in a kitchen; the other in a 
toilet. The Tribunal also found that the camps were bullet-ridden, 
showing indisrimniate firing by the FFU. Some 728 bullets and
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12 tear gas bombs were used and each FFU soldier Fired some 90 
bullets on an average.
Out of some twenty persons injured, fifteen suffered from 
bullet wounds of which four (including a passer-by) died. Of the 
fifteen who suffered bullet wounds, some ten were injured in the 
upper part of the body, clearly showing that bullets were fired to 
kill, in total breach of normal procedures of dealing with civilian, 
unarmed protestors.
In spite of the grave irresponsibility of the regional authorities, 
the only action which seems to have been taken so far was to 
transfer the Regional Commissioner to another region (without 
any loss of prestige or position, it would seem, in the eyes of the 
government or the Party). The Regional Police Commander was 
also transferred and the Regional Crimes Officer dismissed. After 
practising for a couple of years, the former Regional Crimes 
Officer concerned now occupies the position of a corporation 
secretary in a prestigious parastatal! Meanwhile, no criminal 
charges have been preferred against any of these, or other officials 
and soldiers, responsible for the killing.
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1 Sec, lor instance, John Nyamhanga Bisare v R, Criminal 
Appeal No. 29 of 1979, Court of Appeal, where a militiaman 
was convicted of manslaughter and the Court observed obiter 
that reckless use of firearms by militiamen had become com­
mon. (The case is reported at [ 1980] TLR 6 but some pages 
arc missing).
2 Criminal Sessions Case No. 6 of 1986, High Court of Tan­
zania at Tanga, (unrcportcd).
3 Ibid., p.4 of the cyclostyled judgment.
4 Reported in the Daily News, 11/2/89.
5 25/6/88. See also Uhuru, 17/7/88,9/8/88, 9/1/88 and 4/7/88; 
Mfanyakazi, 11/3/89.
6 See, for instance, Uhuru, 22/7/88, 23/6/87, 13/6/87 and 9/9/ 
87 as well as Mfanyakazi, 7/1/89.
7 Daily News, February 1988 (Action Line)
8 Uhuru, 16/2/89
9 See, for instance, the Daily News of 17/10/87 where the 
Regional Police Commander of Dares Salaam admitted that 
there was increased police harassment and that the matter 
was being investigated.
10 Mfanyakazi, 28/11/87
11 R v Abdu S. Abdu, High Court Criminal Sessions Case No. 
40 of 1984, Dar es Salaam, (unreported).
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12 Legal Aid Brief No. 5F/LAB/84/3. The facts are taken from 
the applicant’s letter in the file.
13 This is required by law. See Government Proceedings Act, 
1967, no. 16 amended by Act no.40 of 1974.
14 See also the case of James Magoti who was detained under 
the Preventive Detention Act and severely tortured. Reported 
in Amnesty Interntional Report, 1980, pp.82-3 and discussed 
by Peter, C.M. op.cit. pp.25 et.seq.
15 Thiscasestudy hovers between‘illegal’ a n d ‘extra-legal’ use 
of coercion illustrating the thin line between the two.
16 Abdi Athumani & 9 Others v R, Misc. Civil Cases No. 2 & 
3 of 1987, High Court of Tanzania at Songea, (unreported). 
I am grateful to Mselem for drawing my attention to this case.
17 This refers to the tail of a skate - a large flat fish - which is 
often used as a whip.
18 This case study is a borderline case between ‘illegal’ and 
‘extra-legal’ coercion but is included in this chapter because 
no official attempt was made to justify it, although those res­
ponsible have not been prosecuted, to date.
19 Daily News, 1/8/86.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXTRA-LEGAL COERCION
A review of the post-independence history of Tanzania reveals 
that in times o f ‘crisis’ the state has unhesitatingly resorted to the 
use of force against citizens. While the proportion of such force, 
and the extent of violation of basic rights, may not be comparable 
to situations under the murderous dictators of Africa, it has nev­
ertheless been fairly widespread, if subtle and undocumented.
The forced villagisation of 1972-74 when massive numbers of 
peasants were moved into villages compulsorily saw an extensive 
use of the FFU. This has never been fully documented, although, 
at the time, there were ‘rumours’ of deaths and certainly burning 
down of huts and property of peasants. During workers’ protests, 
following the Mwongozo in 1971, again the FFU was used to 
round-up protesting workers and particularly to intimidate and 
instil fear. In July 1986, four sugar-cane workers were shot dead 
and a score wounded because they dared to demonstrate for their 
rights.1 Students, both university as well as some secondary 
schools, also have had their share of FFU violence in 1966, 1971 
and again in 1978. Peasants in the countryside, on and off, have 
been intimidated by the FFU. This fate has particularly befallen 
the Datoga (Barbaig) and other pastoralists. They have been 
treated like step-children (‘step-nationalities’) of theTanzanian 
nation.
We have categorised these incidences as illustrative of the use 
o f ‘extra-legal coercion’ not because, even by Tanzanian statutes, 
it was legal, but because it was ostensibly authorised at the highest
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levels of the Party and the State. The immediate implementors 
believed it to be so authorised and could have never conceived of 
it as unlawful or even illegitimate. Thus, to my knowledge, the use 
of extra-legal force has never been challenged in courts of law by 
a private party. Where the excesses have been brought to court, it 
has been done so by the state itself, and in a very selective manner, 
to suit its ideological purposes and perform a legitimising func­
tion, as in the case of Shinyanga/Mwanza torture cases. All these 
issues, and many more, feature in the following three case studies 
which speak for themselves and need no further elaboration.
Case Study 10: The fate of ‘step-nationalities’
This was a court case2which originally involved 23 youth from the 
Datoga or Barbaig nationality who were charged with the murder 
of 21 persons from the Wanyaturu nationality on January, 6th 
1976. The incidence took place in the Iramba district. Apparently, 
on that date a group of Barbaig youths numbering between 80 to 
100 attacked a party of Wanyaturu, allegedly killing the W an­
yaturu. A few weeks earlier a number of Barbaigs had been killed, 
allegedly by the Wanyaturu, including the mother and two sisters 
of one of the accused. This raid, therefore, was to avenge those 
deaths.
Out of the original 23, five died (while in custody?) from 
natural causes before the trial, one was acquitted on grounds of ‘ no 
case to answer’ and, at the end of the trial, 14 were found guilty 
and sentenced to death. On appeal, the convictions and sentences 
of 13 were confirmed by the Court of Appeal.3 The prosecution 
case rested on extra-judicial statements made by the accused in 
which they had admitted the murders, describing in minute detail 
the way they had carried out the killings. These confessions were,
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however, retracted by them in the open court where they put the 
story that they made the statements they did because (1) they had 
been offered inducements in terms of their cattle being released if 
they confessed, (2) they had been instructed by their elders to 
agree to having committed the crime so that their cattle might be 
released and (3) some said they had been beaten and starved. The 
question was whether these confessions were admissible. The 
defence argued that, taking account of the whole surrounding at­
mosphere in which the statements had been made, it could not 
possibly be contended that the statements were voluntary and 
truthful. For the purposes of this case study, it is this atmosphere 
which is directly relevant.
Evidence showed that after the tragedy, the regional authori­
ties decided to round up Barbaig youths in four regions and detain 
them to investigate and locate the culprits. It was also decided, 
apparently at least at as high a level as regional officials, that 20 
head of cattle should be seized from Barbaig families to ensure 
that Barbaigs did not run away. At the same time, there was 
somewhat confused evidence that the Party had simultaneously 
put into effect ‘Operation Barbaig’ to settle the Barbaig perma­
nently in villages as a solution to what was alleged to be a long­
standing feud between Wanyaturu and Barbaig. There was some 
confusion as to whether the tw o ‘operations’ were independent 
of each other or connected. But there was evidence that some of 
the cattle seized were sold and the money was supposedly to be 
used for resettlement. What is immediately relevant for our 
purposes is theway these ‘operations’ were carried out.
Barbaigs were arrested indiscriminately including women, 
elderly people and young girls; they were beaten and tortured 
while girls as young as 14 were raped. They were detained in 
ordinary prisons with criminals and their cattle were seized. There
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was absolutely no evidence that these arrests, detentions and the 
seizure of property was done in accordance with the procedures 
provided in law. But no one questioned them, not even during the 
proceedings in the court! It is interesting to note that while the 
government and Party officials testi tying before the court referred 
to the so-called permanent feud between the two nationalities, 
peasant and ordinary witnesses from both sides and belonging to 
both nationalities said that Barbaig and Wanyaturu had lived in 
peace and that there was no such feud.
The atmosphere is captured in the testimony of one Barbaig 
peasant:4
We were arrested at about 6.00 p.m. We were taken 
to Scnga police post. Many of us were confined there.
There were elders, women and children confined to 
the police post. We were confined in one group. The 
police surrounded us at that place. They were
armed On the same day we were brought to Singida
in police vehicles  Two days later we held a
meeting to find the culprits. At that time our cattle had 
been taken. We did not talk
about our seized cattle, but about finding the killers.
We were beaten up while our women were raped.
... [In re-examination] Yes, I was badly beaten. That 
was the day our cattle were taken. My wife was raped.
The testimony of Samson Ntinda living in Katesh, but a Party 
Chairman in Singida, is quite revealing and needs to be quoted in 
extenso. After hearing about the killings, local Party officials 
called a meeting on the 7th (January 1976).
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Wc took two decisions. Firstly, wc had to report to 
Government to decide what to do. It was our intention 
that senior officials of the Government should come 
over. Secondly, wc considered it necessary to found 
a permanent solution.... Wc considered it desirable 
that as a permanent solution the tribes should be 
settled in villages where they could more conven­
iently be provided with basic amenities. We recom­
mended accordingly. In fact that had been discussed 
in previous meetings...
I attended some of the meetings convened by Gov­
ernment as the result of the recommendations of the 
Party. A move was taken to have Government offi­
cials from this region, Arusha, Dodoma and Sh- 
inyanga regions meet to talk over the whole matter of 
resettling the Barbaigs living in these regions. They 
did in fact meet. Barbaigs in these regions had been 
leading nomadic life. It was, therefore, resolved to 
round them up and resettle them in villages. Yes, 
Barbaigs from these regions were, as the result, 
rounded up. The rounding up started in the same 
month of January but the move to resettle them had 
already started. We involved the police in the exer­
cise but not the C.I.D. in particular. In the meeting ol 
7/1/76 we invited the C.I.D. to give us report of their 
investigations into the tragedy. It was rccommendeu 
that, in order to ensure the Barbaigs were rounded up 
for resettling their cattle, too, should be seized. That 
was Government decision. It was decided at least 20 
heads of cattle should be seized from each family 
(homestead). That was to affect Barbaigs living in all 
the four regions. It was also resolved that Barbaig 
youths should be rounded up. The move were not
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taken in order to identity the culprits. I do not know 
that Government attitude was on this. The cattle at 
first were kept in one holding ground. Later Govern­
ment decided they should be sold to meet the expenses 
of resettling them. The money realised is being used 
to establish permanent villages for Barbaigs. We did 
not thereafter receive any report from C.I.D. as re­
gards their investigations. I was told that some cul­
prits had been arrested alongside the general rounding 
up operation.
Barbaigs normally move in search of grass and 
water for their cattle. They would even move across 
districts and regions. [Answering cross-examination]
I know Government used the police to round them up. 
Yes, they took them to remand prisons where crimi­
nals or criminal suspects are normally kept. They 
were not kept as criminals. They were kept there only 
for convenience. I do not know if there they were 
treated as criminals.
In the resettling operation the police were in­
volved. (It) should be noted that the exercise affected 
other tribes as well. It is true only Barbaigs were kept 
in prison, this because other tribes were willing to be 
resettled. Yes, we used the police to take their cattle. 
I do not know if some Barbaigs had all their cattle 
taken. If that happened it was unfortunate for, it was 
not the intention of the Party. The Police may have 
erred in leaving some Barbaigs without any cattle at 
all.
They were not authorised to rape either. I am not 
aware of raping in the exercise. They were not sup­
posed to beat them up.
Barbaigs had been asked to move into permanent
86
villages. The villages had been already demarcated.
We had them demarcated in this region. All that was 
left was to take them there. They were kept in prison 
before it was decided which of them should be re­
settled in which village. We had not previously or in 
that exercise taken any of them to a village, I cannot 
say if that was punishment. There had been no prob­
lem in resettling other tribes. There were no villages 
demarcated specifically for Barbaigs. They were not 
demarcated according to tribes as that would have 
been contrary to Party and Government Policy. Bar­
baigs were refusing to move into those villages along 
with the other tribes.
The eattle were sold for the development of Bar­
baigs themselves. I did not investigate precisely what 
happened to those cattle. 1 am not aware of a meeting 
held with Barbaig where they pleaded for return of 
some of their cattle.5
Meanwhile in early 1980s some of the Datoga people in the 
Hanang District became victims of a different type of violation. 
This time, not allegedly because they were refusing to move into 
villages, but because they complained that their village land was 
confiscated by a parastatal. In March 1981, the Mulbadaw Village 
Council together with 66 other villagers 148 from agro-pastoralist 
Iraqw, 16 from Datoga and 2 from Somali nationalities) sued the 
National Food and Agricultural Corporation (NAFCO) for tres­
pass to land.6 The Plaintiffs alleged that their village and huts and 
crops were razed to ground by NAFCO caterpillars and their land 
taken away and integrated in the gigantic wheat farms. NAFCO is 
involved in developing wheat farms in Basotu with the financial 
and technical assistance of the Canadian International Develop­
ment Agency (CIDA). The villagers won the case in the lower
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court but lost it on appeal to the Court of Appeal. Before finally 
deciding the appeal, the Court of Appeal had issued an interim 
order of stay of execution to the Plaintiffs, who had already started 
cultivating the land returned to them following the High Court 
success. NAFCO, with the assistance of the FFU, scmi-perma- 
nently stationed in Katcsh, evicted the Plaintiffs forcefully in the 
process humiliating and subjecting them to the beating and torture 
of the FFU. One of the victims, Gidadel Jaladi, who was one of 
the original Plaintiffs in the case, told the researchers the follow­
ing story:
It was 19 February [1985] around 1.00 p.m. I was 
returning from watering my cattle. A NAFCO lan- 
drover from the direction of Katesh town pulled up 
beside me. Mwaigul, NAFCO’s Assistant Manager, 
was seated in the front seat beside the driver. In the 
back, there were four armed Field Force Unit (FFU) 
soldiers and a plainclothesman. Mzee Duncan was 
also in the vehicle.
Mwaigul pointed me out. The soldiers threaten­
ingly ordered me to board the vehicle. I had no guts to 
ask questions. The vehicle drove to Mahmud’s farm.
The soldiers jumped out firing shots in the air. I was 
also moved out. One of the soldiers started beating me 
with a stick. Beating, kicking and blows rained on 
those who were at Mai lud ’s farm including the 
Chairman of Mulbadaw » illage, Jonas Samo. Jonas 
was whipped with his own belt; the metal buckle 
struck him on the head, blood gushed out.
W Daniel, Duncan, Jonas and myself in the 
vehicle, ihe landrover drove towards the Mulbadaw 
Farm offices of NAFCO. The soldiers were given 
beer and some food. Then we were driven to NAFCO
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offices and staff houses at Waret. On the way, the 
soldiers laughed and amused themslevcs at our ex­
pense, all the while firing shots in the air.
At Warct, the vehicle was driven around the houses 
of NAFCO managers and white expatriates. More 
beer was served to the soldiers. The day was wet and 
chilly as it had rained heavily that dav. It w p c ^ te  in 
the evening.
‘Masikio’ (ears!) called out one of the soldiers 
referring to me on account of my pierced ears. At 
gunpoint I was orderted to lie down in a ditch and roll 
in the mud. I began to shiver. Jonas, the Chairman, 
was called ‘chairman of Wamang’ati’. [This is a de­
rogatory term used to refer to Datoga people - IGSJ 
He was also ordered to roll in the mud. Meanwhile 
women and children from the surrounding houses 
were watching us and NAFCO staff seemed to be 
amused and happy.
We were then driven to the Katesh police station 
where we spent a night in custody. We were released 
the next day. After a few days I was again followed. 
We spent a few days in Katesh and then we were sent 
to Babati.
At Babati nine of us were charged with disobedi­
ence of the lawful order of the Court of appeal; 
criminal trespass on NAFCO land and threatening 
violence in a manner likely to cause a breach of the 
peace. We pleaded not guilty. Some of us were 
released on bail while others were refused and were 
finally released on bail. The criminal case is still 
pending against us in the District Court at Babati. We 
complained to Regional Police authorities against 
the treatment accorded to us but to no avail.
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Some time after this story was published in the Africa Events7, 
the prosecution entered nolle prosequi in the criminal case men­
tioned by Gidadel.
Case Study 11: The Shinyanga/Mwanza Tragedy
Sometime in the middle of the seventies, there was a spate of 
killings in Mwanza and Shinyanga of suspected witchdoctors. 
Apparently, the situation had become so bad that a high-powered 
joint meeting of the Regional Security and Defence Committees 
met on 24 January 1976 under the chairmanship of the then Vice 
President and Prime Minister Mr. Rashidi Kawawa. The then 
Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Ali Hassan Mwinyi, and the then 
Minister in the President’s Office, Mr. Peter Siyowelva, as well as 
the Regional Commissioner for Mwanza, Mr. Peter Kisumo, were 
also present. The meeting was also attended by regional security 
officers and Party and other government leaders. At this meeting 
it was resolved that all those who were suspected of murders 
(including those who had been taken to court but acquitted for lack 
of evidence) should be arrested and interrogated. Those against 
whom there was enough evidence should be sent to court while 
those against whom there was not enough evidence should be de­
tained. This resolution got christened ‘Operation Mauaji’ (liter­
ally ‘killings’!).
The interrogations began in ernest. In Mwanza they lasted for 
about three weeks beginning 26 January 1976. In Shinyanga they 
lasted for ten days from 21 February to 3 March 1976. In Mwanza 
the suspects were interrogated at the Butimba prison. The inter­
rogation was done by security officers who were in charge includ­
ing some who had been sent from Dar es Salaam specially for the 
purpose. Apparently, this was because it was believed that the 
police had been lax in the matter. In Shinyanga interrogations
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were done in an isolated place near Mwangh’ola in three 
abandoned cotton buying centers.
Some 374 suspects were rounded up in Mwanza while some 
524 in Shinyanga. All these were interrogated. In Shinyanga some 
10 died, 8 after interrogations, while 109 were ordered to be 
detained. Many more at both places were maimed for life. As a 
result of the deaths, a number of regional level security officers 
were charged with murder in two separate trials. In Mwanza8 some 
5 persons were charged with the murder of Mazenguka and 
Mwanankobuku who died on 30 January and 9 February 1976 
respectively. In Shinyangag, some 8 officers were charged with 
the murder of Twiga who died on 16 March 1976 and Kaliji 
Kang’wina who died on 18 March 1976.
Meanwhile the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister in the 
President’s Office and the Regional Commissioner, Mwanza re­
signed taking political responsibility for the incidence.
‘Operation Mauaji’ will go down as a tragedy in the annals of 
Tanzanian history. It was gruesome, degrading, inhuman and 
frightening as to what the organs of force even in Tanzania are 
capable of. As the High Court Judge in the Ihuya case observed:
...[Tjhere is no dispute in this case that what was 
originally expected to be an orderly and lawful exe­
cution ‘operation mauaji ’ turned out to be an exercise 
of human degradation and torture. Suspects were 
stripped naked, beaten up and had pepper shoved into 
their orifices - including into their private parts. Male 
suspects had their testicles tied with strings and 
pulled and female suspects were subjected to most 
unspeakable degradation.10
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The true gravity of the torture involved can only be gauged 
from the testimony of those who actually witnessed it or suffered 
under it. We quote at length the testimony of two, a policeman who 
actually saw Mazenguka dying and a woman who suffered and 
lived to testify in the Shinyanga trial.
Detective Sergeant Castory said:
I had known Mazegenuka before the day we ar­
rested him. He was also physically fit on the following 
morning at Kigolo. While there Dr. Nkulila asked 
Mazegenuka to pull up his shirt ready for an injection 
on his arm. He injected some medicine on his left 
upper arm. I did not know the type of medicine 
injected. After the injection he was sent into a room 
where two people from Dar es Salaam started taking 
down his historical background. They also interro­
gated him about the murders committed at Magu. 
Mazegenuka denied knowing anything about the 
murders. Up to this time Mazegenuka was in good 
health. After they had interrogated him the 3rd and the 
4th accused ordered the deceased to strip naked. He 
stripped naked and they (3rd and 4th accused) ordered 
him to enter into another room. Mazegenuka com­
plied. Soon after a security officer from Magu also 
entered the room. I also got into the room. While in the 
room the 4th accused brought a sisal-rope (as thick as 
my little finger) and tied Mazegenuka’s arms and 
ordered him to sit down against a wall and raise his 
arms backwards. Then the rope on his arms was tied 
to rods of a window. Then the security officer from 
Magu came and tied Mazegenuka’s scrotum with a 
sisal-rope and pulled them. The 4th accused then took 
a stick and started beating him on his thighs using
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great force and telling him to confess that he had 
committed murders at Magu. Mazegenuka cried - 
‘You arc killing me I have done nothing.’ As he was 
being slashed the other security officer was pulling 
Mazcgenuka‘s testicles. The 4th accused stopped 
beating the deceased and the 3rd accused took over 
and continued the beating and urging the deceased to 
confess that he had murdered people at Magu. The 
other security officer continued pulling deceased’s 
testicles. Then in the room came the first accused ac­
companied by the Regional Crimes Officer of Sh­
inyanga, one Kinonko. The first accused took a stick 
(from a heap of sticks on the floor) and also beat the 
deceased on the thighs and the other security officer 
was still pulling deceased’s testicles. As the 1st ac­
cused was attacking him he was saying to him - ‘Tell 
us what you did at Magu’. The deceased only cried. 
He did not confess at anything. The 1st accused left 
but the 4th accused continued interrogating the de­
ceased. He was interrogating him and at the same time 
beating him - urging him to confess. The deceased did 
not confess to anything. The deceased got so ex­
hausted that he could cry no more. As the security 
officer was pulling his private parts I could see a white
fluid exuding from the urethra. At this stage Mr. 
Kinonko told them to stop beating the deceased and 
they stopped. At this time Mazegenuka’s condition 
was in bad shape. We all left the room after Kinonko 
had told them to stop beating the deceased. We drank 
soda outside. Both 3rd and 4th accused were in the 
room from the time we entered to the time we all got 
out.
When we returned to the room we found that the 
Mazegenuka had died.11
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In the Shinyanga trial, Habiba Shabani, a peasant Muslim 
woman testified as follows:
We were all driven to Shinyanga Police Station. We 
spent a night there. The following day we were taken 
to the court. I had no opportunity to question my 
incarceration for the askaris were very kali [fear­
some], rebuking us. At the court a charge was read 
out. It was also alleged that the 5 of us had murdered 
some woman! Even the woman’s name was not 
mentioned. We were told to remain in custody for 
mention on another date. We were then taken to 
Shinyanga Prison. I recall wc were taken to court 
again after a number of days - I cannot recall how 
many. It was a mention date and we were informed 
that investigations were continuing. Another mention 
date was fixed.
We stayed in Prison at Shinyanga for one month.
We were then taken to Mwangh’ola. We were 9 
women and about 40 or 41 men. There came a tipper 
with policemen and we were taken. We left Sh­
inyanga in the morning. We were taken first to Malya 
Prison. We were told the Prison was full. We were 
driven on straight to Mwangh’ola. Just before reach­
ing there we met a motor vehicle which stopped us.
We were told by a CID that the time was over; that 
they were tired of beating. We were driven back to 
Malya Prison where we reached between 3 and 4 p.m.
The prisoners had just finished eating. We got no 
meal. We slept in the prison.
The following morning, after drinking uji, [por­
ridge] we were taken back to Mwangh’ola. Same 
tipper was used and we had askaris with us. We 
reached there in the forenoon. The place Mwagh’olo
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is in the pori [jungle). There is an abandoned cotton 
store. There was a second a store [sic!] and a third 
smaller building. We were ordered down. We were 
ordered to squat outside one of the stores, facing the 
door. Two youths were taken inside the store and we 
heard them pounding with pestles. Apparently, they 
were pounding pepper. Meanwhile askaris were all 
over with sticks and guns saying ‘kila mlu asalie 
mtume wake. Umefika wakati wa kuieleza.’ [Let 
every person pray to his/her god. Time of reckoning 
has arrived.] They told us we would be thoroughly 
beaten even unto death or be maimed.
We were then ordered into that store where the 
pounding had been taking place. We were mixed up 
- men and women. We entered the store running. I in 
fact fell in the doorway in the stampede. All the 
women entered. On entering we were ordered to 
undress very quickly. We were then ordered to line up 
along the wall. An old man who was ahead of me was 
ordered to lie on his back. He complied. One of us was 
ordered to smear the old man with pepper solution in 
the mouth, nostrils, eyes, private parts. It was done. 
His prepuce was pulled and pepper stuffed therein. He 
was not circumcised. He was ordered to stand and go 
aside - being beaten with each such order. The old 
man was crying from the irritation of pepper and he 
was beaten to slop making noise.
Next came my turn. I was ordered to lie on my 
back. I compiled. The pepper was put in my eyes, 
nostrils, mouth, ears and in my private parts. Husks 
and seeds of pepper were on orders, forced into my 
vagina in plenty. It swelled up like a loaf of bread. The 
youth who was doing the stuffing was ordered to stuff 
pepper even into my anus. The man was a Mhaya. He
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had to comply. It was all painful. If I tried to wipe the 
pepper off I was beaten up. 1 was then - under beating 
- ordered to join the old man. All of us were treated 
with pepper then our names were called out. But 
before that we had to wait lying on our backs, one leg 
raised. Then we were called one by one to the second 
store.
I was called. On the way were askaris in the second 
house - but they were dressed in civilian clothes. One 
had papers; another had a stick. They were not in 
uniform. I was told to sit. I sat. I was told to stretch my 
arms and legs. I was beaten all over my arms. It was 
a severe beating. I was being asked: ‘umepata wapi 
mali? Jangiri wee!’ [Where did you get the property 
from? You cheat!] I was being beaten with a short 
stick. (‘Kafimbo kafupi.’) I told them how I acquired 
my property. I was asked how I got a Honda (motor­
cycle?) I said I had purchased it. I was excused. I went 
back to the pepper house - beaten by askaris all the 
way - and was ordered to take my clothes, I took them.
I knew Kang’ombe Kaliji. I first came to know 
him when he failed to board the vehicle after we had 
been beaten. I knew his name because askaris were 
saying ‘Pigeni tena kama hataki kuinuka.’ [Beat him 
again if he doesn’t want to get up]. He was crying and 
complaining of tremendous pain. They had to put him 
on the lorry. Before the beating none of us was unable 
to board the lorry on his own.
When he was taken on the lorry, Kang’ombe failed 
to sit. He had to be supported. We were then driven 
back to Maswa Prison. We were ordered down to go 
and eat. We came down - can’t tell whether it was all 
of us because I could not observe for fear. We entered 
the prison. We did not spend the night there. After
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eating we were ordered back on our tipper. We were 
driven back to Shinyanga. Kang’ombe was with us.
But on the way, Kang’ombe gave up his soul. He had 
been vomiting blood. At Shinyanga wc 
were taken to Prison. We came down. Kang’ombe’s 
body was brought down and deposited at the Prison 
door. The prison officer refused to accept the body 
saying he does not receive bodies in his prison. We 
left the body at the door and were driven into the 
prison. It was Saturday. We were released on Mon­
day.
The Mwangh’ola operation was very savage. My 
left leg is now lame and I no longer enjoy sex. The 
vagina had sores for about 2 years and it is now all but 
scars. I have lost the sex urge.12
Three further features of these two trials need to be quickly 
mentioned. First, in both trials medical doctors were involved 
contrary to professional ethics and integrity. In the Mwanza trial, 
a doctor was used to administer methedine to the suspects so as to 
make them talk during the interrogation. And in the court he said 
that ethically it was alright for him to have administered those 
injections.13
In the Shinyanga trial a doctor had been instructed by the Area 
Commissioner to make out false post-mortem reports. The doctor 
actually obliged, opining that the deceased had died of tuberculo­
sis without even conducting an autopsy. When questioned on this 
he deposed that he had taken oath to keep government secrets! 
And that he complied with the instructions of the Area Commis­
sioner because he thought they had ‘presidential blessings’.14
Second, a number of fairly high-ranking police and security 
officers in the witness box testified that they knew what was being
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done was unlawful but were still prepared to do it because orders 
came from the top. Thus in the Mwanza trial an Assistant Com­
missioner of Prisons admitted that,
As a prison officer if the Vice President tells me to put 
a person in remand I comply although I know it is 
legally wrong to do so. I thought it was right as it was 
a decision of the government. If I did not comply I 
would have jeopardized my carrier [sic!]. I agree our 
country is led by the laws of the land.16
Third, it was implied between the lines in the defence submis­
sions in both trials (although never seriously pressed), that some 
‘big shots’ had been left out, and that only relatively small fry had 
been brought to court as ‘sacrificial lambs’. It is inconceivable that 
while this massive ‘operation’ was in operation for at least one 
month, top officials, and at least regional politicians, were simply 
ignorant. In the Mwanza trial the Assistant Commissioner of 
Police in fact testified that he had informed a regional security 
meeting chaired by the Regional Commissioner, Mr. Peter Kisumo, 
that he, the Commissioner, had observed serious injuries on the 
suspects. To which the first accused, Ihuya, had retorted that he, 
(the Assistant Commisioner), was supposed to keep government 
secrets and that there was no need to send them to the Bugando 
hospital. The Assistant Commissioner further testified,
The chairman, Mr. Peter Kisumo also replied me that 
‘interrogation is interrogation’. In view of what I had 
told the meeting about the injuries I observed on some 
of the suspects I understood the chairman to mean that 
the beating while conducting interrogations was 
proper.16
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While the said Regional Commissioner resigned taking with 
him the credit of having assumed political responsibility, those 
who thought they were carrying out superior (government) orders 
were charged and convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 
serve imprisonment for terms ranging from five to fifteen years.
Case Study 12: Sungusungu on the rampage
The following case study describes a typical form of oppression 
and harassment by the so-called tradional army known by differ­
ent names (Sungusungu, Wasalama, etc.) These armies have been 
in operation in Mara, Mwanza, Tabora and Shinyanga regions.
The plaintiff in the case Misperesi K. Maingu v Hamisi Mtongori 
& 9 Others17 was claiming damages of over one million shillings 
against the ten defendants for trespass on his person and property. 
The ten defendants belonged to Sungusungu of Mwenge Village, 
Nyamatare ward in Musoma District. On 22/9/87 Maingu and his 
colleague Paulo were summoned before the Mwenge tradional 
army, tried for the offence of swindling one of the defendants of 
T.shs.85000/- some time in 1981. Each of them was ordered to pay 
back T.shs.42,500/- and a fine of T.shs. 10,000/-.0n 28/11/87 
when the plaintiff had failed to pay the compensation and the 
fine, the defendants seized his property worth over 
T.shs. 190,000/-.
The plaintiff appealed to the Divisional Office but 
his appeal was dismissed. He further appealed to the 
District Commissioner who ordered that part of the 
property be restored to the plaintiff pending the 
sitting of the District Committee for Defence and 
security. Part of the property was restored to the 
plaintiff. However in due course the District Com­
mittee for Defence and Security in its decision ... 
decided that the judgment of the Mwenge traditional
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army was correct and ordered that all the property that 
had been restored to the plaintiff should be reseized.
And so the whole property of the plaintiff was re- 
seized.18
Again on 11/12/87 for no apparent reason the plaintiff was 
arrested by the members of the traditional army and kept in lock 
up at the Musoma police station for one day. He was later released 
without any charge being preferred against him. Then on 24/12/ 
87 the plaintiff paid the fine of T.shs. 10,000/- in the hope that the 
property would be restored to him. Instead, the traditional army 
senteneed him to 25 strokes of corporal punishment or a fine of 
T.shs.2500/- in lieu of the strokes. He paid the fine.
Mwalusanya, J. in this case, following his own previous 
decisionsl9, held the traditional army to be illegal and their 
assumption of judicial and police powers as unconstitutional. He 
awarded damages to the plaintiff in the sum of T.shs. 353,150/- 
and once again castigated the party organs and leaders lor sanc­
tioning the operation of traditional armies outside the rule of law.
In this case the plaintiff was undoubtedly a man of some 
substance and therefore could and did fight his case up to the High 
Court. But thedaily harassment and oppression of ordinary villag­
ers by these armies in many cases go unremedied as the following 
letter implies.
Brother Editor:
We the residents of Ukerewe distriet greeted with 
pleasure the inauguration of the traditional army 
(Sungusungu) in the Mwanza region in the hope that, 
together with the Police, they would have helped to 
deal with robbery, racketeering, swindling etc.
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Instead it has been killing, harassment and moles­
tation of innocent citizens. Should some one suspect 
you of theft or that you have failed to repay a loan and 
the person concerned complaints to sungusungu or 
wasalama, as they call themselves, you would wish 
you were never born.
If they suspect you it is better to confess. If you 
don’t you are in greater trouble - they would whip you 
all over the body and buttocks like an ox.
Even if you confess and then the stolen article 
cannot be traced, you would be beaten till you lose 
consciousness. And if you happen to have any cattle, 
those will be confiscated.
After the confiscation of your cattle your case is 
over and you are a free man again. Also, when you are 
being whipped, don’t dare cry, for if you cry, they 
would construe it to mean that you are mocking at 
them as if you were their equal.
Following such beatings many citizens have lost 
their lives or become mentally disturbed.
A good incidence is that which happened in Busanda 
village in Ukerewe district where a villager was 
arrested by sungusungu for failure to pay develop­
ment levy. When he tried to escape he was shot at with 
an arrow and died instantly.
And another example occurred in Bugula village 
also in the Ukerewe district when another person tried 
to escape by hiding in his home. The sungusungu set 
his house to fire and it was his wit that saved him 
otherwise he would have lost his life.20
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above.
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4 P.65. These page numbers are from the Record of Appeal in 
the Court of Appeal Registry.
5 Ibid., pp.78-80.
6 See Shivji, I. & Tenga, R., ‘Ujamaa in Court’, Africa Events 
1, 2:18-21, (Dec. 1985). NAFCO v Mulbadaw Village 
Council & Others, Civ. App. No.3 of 1985 (Court Appeal) 
(Unreported)
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8 R v Ihuya & 4 Others, High Court Criminal Sessions Case 
No. 8 of 1980 at Mwanza (unrcported). The appeal is God­
frey James Ihuya & Others v R [ 1980] TLR 197. Page num­
bers cited herein in the Ihuya (High Court) case are from the 
Record of Appeal in the Court od Appeal Registry.
9 R v Kigadye & 7 Others, High Court Criminal Sessions Case 
No. 85 of 1980 at Shinyanga. The appeal is Elias Kigadye & 
Others v R, [1981] TLR 355. All page numbers for the High 
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15 P.8. See also p.50 of the Shinyanga trial where another police 
officer answered to the same effect.
16 Pp.7-9.
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ported).
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19 See chapter two above for discussion.
20 Uhuru, 19/4/88.
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CONCLUSION
RIGHTS-STRUGGLE AND DEMOCRACY
The case studies in this monograph have shown that the rights- 
question in Tanzania, and elsewhere in Africa, we dare say, goes 
beyond simply the violation of personal freedom of the individual. 
Here wc are dealing with a formation in which the freedom and 
liberty of the large majority are at stake, because the society itself 
is enslaved. We arc therefore addressing a much more profound 
issue which cannot simply be captured within the conceptual 
framework of individual rights or Western liberal perspective.
This study (among others1) has demonstrated that in an African 
neo-colonial formation, law is an instrument for the application of 
state coercion and plays a subordinate role, if any at all, in legit­
imising the rule of the dominating class. It is not the legal ideology 
that occupies the centre-stage. Hegemonies are sought on other 
ideological planes, rather than law.
If law does not have an hegemonic significance, neither does 
it act as a restraint on the state, its organs and officials in the use 
of coercion. The widespread incidence of ‘illegal coercion’ re­
counted in this study shows that.
Explanations for the emergence and existence of what might 
be called right-less law are to be found in the character of the 
political economy of these countries. Force is integral to, or 
imbricated in, the production relations of a neo-colonial, imperi­
alist-dominated social formation.2 The producer - whether a 
worker or a peasant - is subjected to super-exploitation. The 
apparent role of the market in pumping out surplus from the 
producer is subordinate to the role of state coercion, which is
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apparent on the surface, it is thus that the relations of (supcr)- 
exploitation are reproduced.
So the struggle for rights, for democracy, has wider and deeper 
implications and goes beyond the usual liberal assumptions and 
premises o f ‘individual rights’ and ‘limited government’. Central 
to this struggle is the struggle to ‘free’ the producer’s labour from 
multifarious forms of force and bondage. It is indeed a process of 
constituting the civil society. Yet this cannot simply be a repeti­
tion of the process of development of capitalism (Maine’s move­
ment from status to contract), for what weighs down upon these 
societies are the world imperialist structures, even if such struc­
tures may be in erstwhile alliance with local feudal, semi-feudal, 
merchant or bureaucratic forces.
The current debate on democracy in Africa, accompanied as it 
is by recompradorisation a la IMF, has the danger of dangling the 
goal of liberal democracy - multiparty system, constitutionalism, 
entcrprcneurship, etc. - before the popular, particularly middle- 
class, forces in Africa and thereby bury the agenda of the anti- 
imperialist, new democratic revolution3 As Samir Amin puts it:
Western democracy is lacking in any social dimen­
sion. The popular democracy of the moments of 
revolutionary social transformation (such as the USSR 
in the 1920s, Maoist China) also teaches us a great 
deal about the nature of any ‘popular participation’, to 
use a tired expression, which is to have real meaning.
To conserve Western democratic forms without tak­
ing into consideration the social transformations 
demanded by the anti-capitalist revolt of the periph­
ery is to become trapped within a travesty of bour­
geois democracy, which will remain alien to the
105
people and consequently extremely vulnerable. In 
order to take root, democracy should above all in­
scribe itself within a perspective which moves be­
yond capitalism.4
In the same vein, the human rights discourse, imported uncriti­
cally from the West, can act as a dominating, rather than a 
liberating, ideology for the working people. We need, therefore, 
to recast these ideologies within the paradigms of anti-imperialist, 
popular democracy. Rights-struggle too has to be seen in this 
perspective.5
As a struggle from below, the importance of rights-struggle lies 
not so much in achieving certain standards in legal documents; 
rather its importance lies in providing the standard-bearer for the 
autonomous, organisational mobilisation of the working people. 
If it is to play the role of an ideology of resistance and struggle, the 
rights-ideology, and constitutionalism6 as a whole, need to be 
recast.
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Some Reflections on the Role of Legal Ideology’, Ohio 
State Law Journal 46, 3:689-95 (1985)
2 See generally Mamdani, M. ‘Contradictory Class Perpce 
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